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NOTES

GRAVEYARD ROBBERY IN THE OMNIBUS
BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1993:
A MODERN LOOK AT THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
RETROACTIVE TAXES
No man's property is safe while the legislature is in session.
- Mark Twain
I bet it comes as a heck of a shock to poor old departed Uncle Louie who
never guessed Clinton, with the IRS, would hound him through the
afterlife for yet anothercontributionor anotherinvestment .... Now on
his deathbed instead of asking for a priest or for his dearly beloved to
gatheraround him, Uncle Louie must ask for his tax lawyer to see him
through his last moments, and his last earthly comments will be,
"Quick, shift all of my investments into shelters."
- Senator John McCain, on August 6, 1993,
on the Senate Floor during the 1993
budget debate
INTRODUCTION
On August 10, 1993, President Bill Clinton signed into law his
1993 budget bill, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
(Budget Act).' The Budget Act contains several highly controversial tax provisions which apply retroactively to the last weeks of the
prior administration. 2 The first of these provisions increases the
income tax rates on both wealthier Americans and corporations and
3
applies the new rates retroactively to January 1, 1993.
1. Barbara Kircheimer, PresidentSigns Tax Bill; Retroactivity Debate Lingers, 60 TAx NoTEs 911, 911 (1993).
2. The income tax rate changes, both personal and corporate, as well as
the estate and gift tax rate changes, apply to January 1, 1993, when George
Bush was still in office. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 §§ 13201,
13208, 13221, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1, 11, 2001 (1993).
3. David S. Cloud, New Levies on Gas and the Rich Would Yield $240 Billion, CONG. Q., Aug. 7, 1993, at 2132-33. The Budget Act creates a new fourth
bracket for individuals and raises the top rate from 31% to 36%. Id. at 2132.
The new rate applies to couples making more than $140,000 or single taxpayers
earning more than $115,000. Id. Individuals making more than $250,000
would be assessed a 10% surtax, bringing their rate up to 39.6%. Id. A similar
top bracket is added to the corporate income tax structure, increasing the top
rate from 34% to 35% where corporate income exceeds $10 million. Id. at 2133.
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The second provision, in effect, allows the Clinton administration and the 103rd Congress to reach beyond the grave and tax the
dead, even those who died during the Bush administration. This
second controversial provision increases the estate and gift tax
rates and applies such rates retroactively to January 1, 1993, several days before Clinton and the new 103rd Congress were even
sworn in.4 Despite the fact that the retroactive provisions only affect the wealthiest Americans, public outrage over the retroactivity
has nonetheless been enormous., Congressional leaders have introduced legislation to repeal the retroactive tax provisions 6 and have
proposed constitutional amendments. 7 Constitutional challenges to
the retroactive tax provisions are already underway in the court
system.8 The fate of the Budget Act appears even more uncertain
in light of the United States Supreme Court's recent grant of certiorari to hear a case involving the constitutionality of retroactive
taxation. 9
This Note examines the constitutionality of the retroactive tax
4. Cloud, supra note 3, at 2133. The Budget Act raises the estate and gift
tax rate for transfers valued between $2.5 and $3 million from 50% to 53%. Id.
For transfer over $3 million, the Budget Act raises the rate from 50% to 55%.
Id. These rates had been lowered to 50% as of January 1, 1993, and the Budget
Act retroactively reinstates these top two rates as if they had never been lowered. Id.
5. See, e.g., Repeal Retroactivity!, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 1993, at A12.
6. See, e.g., Efforts Are Under Way to Strip Out Retroactive Application of
Tax Hike, DAILY TAX REP., Aug. 10, 1993, at 65. On August 6, 1993, Representative Richard Armey (R-Texas) introduced a bill (HR 2913) that would eliminate the retroactive tax provisions of the budget bill. Id. at 66. Republicans
will introduce similar legislation to repeal the provisions in the fall of 1994. Id.
7. Id. at 66. On August 6, 1993, Senators Paul Coverdell (R-Ga) and John
McCain (R-Ariz) proposed a constitutional amendment banning retroactive
taxes (SJRes 120). Id. Senator Bob Bennett also proposed a constitutional
amendment to prohibit retroactive taxation. Dina ElBoghdady, Bennett Introduces Bill to Ban Retroactive Taxes, States News Services, Aug. 5, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, SNS File. The proposed amendment would
state that: "No Federal tax shall be imposed for the period before the date of
enactment of the tax." Id.
8. The Landmark Legal Foundation and the National Taxpayers Union
(NTU) brought suit against the United States government on August 27, 1993.
Legal Challenge to New Tax Bill Filed, NAT'L TAXPAYERS UNION NEWS (National
Taxpayers Union, Washington, D.C.), Aug: 27, 1993, at 30. The suit challenges
the retroactivity of the estate and gift tax provisions in the Budget Act, claiming that the tax provisions violate the Constitution's prohibitions against unapportioned direct taxation, the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Complaint for Declaratory Injunctive Relief, National Taxpayer's Union, Inc. v. United States, No. 93-1796
(D.D.C. filed Aug. 27, 1993) (on file with The John Marshall Law Review).
Plaintiffs do not challenge the income tax provision of the budget. Id.
Former presidential candidate Pat Buchanan and his organization American Cause have also announced a suit challenging the budget plan's retroactive
taxes. David A. Coin, Buchanan To Sue Over Retroactive Tax Boost, WASH.
TIMES, Aug. 12, 1993, at A4.
9. Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding unconstitutional retroactive loophole-closing legislation where a taxpayer has reason-
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provisions in the 1993 Clinton budget. Part I of this Note canvasses
the history of retroactive tax legislation and its judicial faring in
the United States. Part II of this Note examines modern due process analysis of retroactive tax legislation and proposes a test which
could be consistently applied in determining when a retroactive tax
offends due process. Lastly, Part III of this Note applies this test,
showing that the retroactive estate, gift, and income tax provisions
of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 are
unconstitutional.
I.

HISTORICAL RETROACTMTY IN UNITED STATES
TAX LEGISLATION

One of Congress' enumerated powers is the power to tax.' 0
This power is necessary for the raising of revenue and the effective
functioning of government."
As the need for revenue has increased, Congress has sought new and different ways to tax the
populace. 12 Congress has turned to the retroactive tax as one tactic
for raising revenue. 13 A statute is retroactive if it "gives preenactment conduct a different legal effect from that which it would have
had without the passage of the statute." 14 Yet retroactive taxes
may be unjust' 5 and are often unconstitutional.' 6 Retroactive
taxes may be unjust because they interfere with a person's ability to
plan his financial affairs with some degree of certainty as to the
legal consequences of his actions.' 7 Retroactive taxes may also vioably relied to his detriment on the prior loophole), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 55
(1993).
10. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. For the full text of this clause, see infra
note 20.
11. See generally Note, Setting Effective Dates for Tax Legislation:A Rule of
Prospectivity, 84 HARv. L. REV. 436, 441 (1970) [hereinafter Rule of Prospectiv-

ity] (noting that the government will often justify retroactivity out of "administrative and revenue concerns"). For cases emphasizing the government's need
to raise revenue, see infra note 79.
12. See Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142 (1927), modified, 276 U.S. 594
(1928); Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440 (1928) (both cases holding that

the retroactive application of the first gift tax was unconstitutional).

13. For the Treasury Department's list of retroactive tax rate increases between 1917 and 1976, see infra note 273.
14. Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of
Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARv. L. REV. 692, 692 (1960). Many prospective
statutes will fall within this definition, even though their date of application is
not retroactive. Id. Prospective statutes may be passed which annul preexisting obligations. Id.
15. For arguments that retroactive taxes are unjust, see infra note 17.
16. See, e.g., Coolidge v. Long, 282 U.S. 582 (1931); Blodgett v. Holden, 275
U.S. 142 (1927), modified, 276 U.S. 594 (1928); Untermyer v. Anderson, 276
U.S. 440 (1928); Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531, 542 (1927); Burgess v.
Salmon, 97 U.S. 381 (1878); Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir.
1992), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 55 (1993).
17. Hochman, supra note 14, at 692-93. Hochman gives several other reasons why retroactive legislation is viewed disfavorably. Id. The fluctuations of
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late a variety of constitutional provisions which courts have interpreted as protecting the taxpayer from retroactive taxes. On the
other hand, these constitutional protections of the taxpayer may
sometimes unduly restrict the power of Congress to levy taxes and
collect revenue. 18 Thus, although retroactive taxes may impose
some burden on the taxpayer, the taxing power which the Constitution grants to Congress may justify the imposition of that burden. 19
This section first examines the constitutional power of Congress to tax. This section then discusses how the Constitution may
protect the taxpayer from retroactive taxation. Lastly, this section
examines the legislative justifications for retroactive taxes which
Congress has raised when the protections which the Constitution
affords to the taxpayer collide with the constitutional power of Congress to tax.
A.

Power to Tax

The Constitution of the United States bestows upon Congress
the power to tax in Article I, Section 8. Article I gives Congress the
"power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises ... for
the ...

general welfare of the United States." 20 Further, the Con-

stitution distinguishes between two different categories of taxes
and the corresponding constitutional limitations on each. 21 The
rule of apportionment governs direct taxes, 2 2 which are taxes asthe legislature should not be allowed to harm the people. Id. A stable past is
also threatened by retroactive legislation. Id. In addition, people are guided by
the statutes which their legislatures pass, and retroactivity tends to disturb
such guidance. Id. Another problem with retroactive legislation is that it allows lawmakers to have hindsight and to specifically target who will be affected

by the legislation they have passed. Id. Lastly, the common law supports the
proposition that legislation is to be prospective, although the judiciary has the
right to retroactively apply its decisions. Id.
18. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717
(1984). For further discussion of the extent of constitutionally permissible retroactivity, see infra notes 79-111 and accompanying text.
19. Cf id. at 729 (upholding retroactive tax legislation where there is a "legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means").
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The clause states, "The Congress shall
have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the
Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States .... " Id.
21. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. Article I,
Section 2, Clause 3 first distinguishes the category of direct taxes and states
that "direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States .

. . ."

U.S.

CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 also speaks of the classification of direct taxes, stating that "No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be
laid ...

."

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. The "Duties, Imposts and Excises"

mentioned in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 1 are considered indirect taxes, and,
as such, must be assessed uniformly. Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R., 240 U.S.
1, 13 (1916).
22. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 557 (1895) (holding
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sessed on property based on its value. 23 This rule requires that
24
such taxes be apportioned among the States based on population.
On the other hand, the rule of uniformity applies to the levying
of indirect taxes, 2 5 which are taxes upon rights or privileges. This
rule of uniformity requires that Congress assess duties, imposts,
and excises uniformly throughout the country. 26 While not an indirect tax, the income tax is not required to be apportioned like other
direct taxes due to the Sixteenth Amendment. 2 7 The Sixteenth
Amendment, passed in response to a successful constitutional attack on income taxes, 28 permits Congress to assess income taxes
without apportionment among the States. 29 In legal challenges
similar to that which brought about the Sixteenth Amendment, taxpayers have questioned whether taxes applied retroactively are
30
constitutional.
B.

ConstitutionalAttacks on Retroactive Taxes

Although the Constitution empowers Congress with the authority to tax, it also protects the taxpayer from oppressive taxation. 3 1 While the fear of retroactive taxation seems to have been in
the hearts of the Framers of the Constitution, 3 2 such a fear seems
that the income tax of 1894 was a direct tax which was unconstitutional since it
was not apportioned).
23. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 461 (6th ed. 1990). Direct taxes are based on
the value of the property. Id. Such taxes may be referred to as property taxes
or ad valorem taxes. Id.
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. The clause in part states:
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several
States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of
free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and
excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.
Id.
25. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 557. "[Inthe matter of taxation, the Constitution
recognizes the two great classes of direct and indirect taxes, and lays down two
rules by which their imposition must be governed, namely: The rule of apportionment as to direct taxes, and the rule of uniformity as to duties, imposts, and
excises." Id.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. For a discussion of this clause, see supra
note 20.
27. U.S. CONsT. amend. XVI.

28. See Frederick A. Ballard, RetroactiveFederal Taxation, 48 Harv. L. Rev.
592, 594 (1935). The case which held that the income tax was an unconstitutional direct tax was Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. at 557.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. "The Congress shall have power to lay and

collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment
among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration."
Id.
30. For more information on constitutional challenges to retroactive taxation, see infra notes 31-78 and accompanying text.
31. See Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147 (1938) (holding that a retroactive
tax may, under some circumstances, be "so harsh and oppressive as to transgress the constitutional limitation').
32. The Federalists greatly feared the fluctuations of the legislature. Th
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not to have been translated into a per se Constitutional bar on retroactive taxes. 33 Courts themselves have even admitted not know34
ing exactly what is unconstitutional about retroactive taxation.
Early courts avoided the constitutional issue altogether by construing all tax statutes to apply prospectively, if possible. 35 However, after Congress passed tax statutes that were clearly
retroactive, taxpayers (and their attorneys) then had to delve into
the Constitution in search of restraints on retroactive taxation.
Taxpayers have suggested a variety of Constitutional provisions
36
which may protect the taxpayer to some degree from retroactive
legislation. These include the Ex Post Facto Clause, 37 the Due ProFEDERALIST No. 44, at 282-83 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
This fear would certainly encompass retroactive taxes, which frustrate the taxpayer in trying to plan his affairs.
The sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating policy which has
directed the public councils. They have seen with regret and indignation
that sudden changes and legislative interferences, in cases affecting personal rights, become jobs in the hands of enterprising and influential speculators, and snares to the more industrious and less informed part of the
community. They have seen, too, that one legislative interference is but
the first link of a long chain of repetitions, every subsequent interference
being naturally produced by the effects of the preceding. They very rightly
infer, therefore, that some thorough reform is wanting, which will banish
speculations on public measures, inspire a general prudence and industry,
and give a regular course to the business of society.

Id.
33. Dash v. Van Kleek, 7 Johns. 477, 505 (N.Y. 1811) (finding that a civil
statute providing sheriffs with a defense to certain civil actions applied prospectively). "It is not pretended that we have any express constitutional provision
on the subject [of retroactive civil laws]; nor have we any for numerous other
rights dear alike to freedom and to justice." Id. The most relevant provision of
the Constitution dealing with retroactive legislation is the provision in Article I
decreeing that "[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. For reasons why this clause has not been interpreted to
forbid retroactive tax legislation, see infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
34. See Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Holmes commentted that "I find it hard to state to
myself articulately the ground for denying the power of Congress to lay the
tax." Id. at 446.
35. Courts in early retroactive legislation cases, perhaps realizing that
there was no express Constitutional ban on retroactive taxes, dodged the issue
by formulating a rule of construction. See generally Ray H. Greenblatt, Judicial Limitations on Retroactive Civil Legislation, 51 Nw. U. L. REv. 540, 550-53
(1956). This rule of construction holds that statutes are assumed to apply prospectively, absent a clear statement of contrary intent. Id. at 550. Legislatures
inevitably stepped up to the judicial challenge and passed civil legislation
clearly intended to apply retroactively. See, e.g., Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S.
531, 539 (1927) (finding an estate tax unconstitutional where the statute specified that the tax would apply to any transfer regardless of whether it was made
before or after the passage of the act).
36. The terms "retroactive" and "retrospective" will be used interchangeably throughout this Note.
37. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798). For further discussion of this case, see
infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
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cess Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 38 the Contracts Clause, 39 the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 40 and the
41
requirement that direct taxes be apportioned.
1. The Ex Post Facto Clause
The most obvious Constitutional provision which might bar retroactive taxes is the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Ex Post Facto
Clause forbids Congress from passing any "bill of attainder or ex
post facto law." 42 An ex post facto law is one which is "passed after

the occurrence of a fact or the commission of an act, which retroactively changes the legal consequences or relations of such fact or
deed."

43

However, the case of Calder v. Bull 44 greatly diminished the

applicability of the Ex Post Facto Clause to civil law early in judicial history. In Calder, the Calders had received a favorable judgment in probate court which a subsequent resolution passed by the
Connecticut legislature set aside. 45 As a result, the United States
Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether such a resolu46
tion was an ex post facto law under the Federal Constitution.
Holding against the Calders, the Court interpreted the prohibition
of ex post facto laws to apply only to criminal statutes.4 7 After Cal38. See, e.g., Nichols, 274 U.S. at 542. For further discussion of the due
process argument, see infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Coolidge v. Long, 282 U.S. 582 (1931). For further discussion
of the contract impairment argument, see infra notes 54-61 and accompanying
text.
40. See, e.g., Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938). For further discussion of
the equal protection argument, see infra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895). For
further discussion of the direct tax argument, see infra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. The States are similarly limited by Article
1, Section 10, Clause 1, which states that "No State shall ... pass any Bill of
Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or
grant any Title of Nobility." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
43. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 580 (6th ed. 1990).
44. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
45. Id. at 386-87.
46. Id. at 387.
47. Id. at 391. The Court pronounced four definitions of ex post facto laws:
any law which makes criminal an act innocent when committed; any law that
aggravates a crime after the fact; any law which enhances the punishment of a
previously committed act; and any law which alters evidentiary standards in
favor of the prosecution after the commission of an act. Id. at 390. The Court
also distinguished between ex post facto laws and retroactive laws, noting that
while every ex post facto law must, by definition, be retroactive, the converse is
not true. Id. at 391.
The Calder Court further stated that the Ex Post Facto Clause was not
intended to "secure the citizen in his private rights, of either property, or contracts." Id. at 390. But cf THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton). "To
bereave a man of life [says he] or by violence to confiscate his estate, without
accusation or trial, would be so gross and notorious an act of despotism as must
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der, constitutional challenges to retroactive taxes began to focus on
the due process concerns of the taxpayer.
2. The Due Process Attack
Although Calderseverely constrained constitutional attacks on
retroactive taxation on ex post facto grounds, such attacks have
been much more successful on Fifth Amendment due process
grounds. The Fifth Amendment states that no person shall "be de48
prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law."
The Fourteenth Amendment makes this protection applicable to
49
the States.
Thus, a tax may be so "arbitrary and capricious" that it
amounts to a taking without due process, in violation of the Fifth
Amendment.5 0 In Nichols v. Coolidge, the Federal government attempted to include as part of the decedent's taxable estate, property
which the decedent had transferred to others in 1917.51 The estate

tax in question was approved in 1919 and attempted to include in
the value of the decedent's estate any transfers made prior to or
after passage of the act.52 Since the amount of tax was based on
prior legal transactions, the Court found the tax to be "arbitrary,
whimsical, and burdensome" and, therefore, unconstitutional under
at once convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the whole nation." Id. (emphasis added).

However, the applicability of the Ex Post Facto Clause to retroactive taxes
should not be completely foreclosed. In explaining when retroactivity should be
allowed, the Court mentions only acts of pardon and acts conferring benefits
retroactively. Calder,3 U.S. at 391. In fact, the Court declares that, as a general rule, no law should be retroactive and that retroactive legislation is "generally unjust, and may be oppressive." Id.

Further, the Calder Court's narrow interpretation of the Ex Post Facto
Clause is not absolute. A civil statute may be unconstitutional as an ex post
facto law where it, in effect, attempts to impose a penalty. Burgess v. Salmon,
97 U.S. 381 (1878). But see Licari v. Commissioner, 946 F.2d 690 (9th Cir.
1991) (holding that the retroactive increase in a monetary penalty for questionable deductions did not deny equal protection). In Burgess, the United States

Supreme Court refused to apply an increased tax to a quantity of tobacco that

had been sold the morning the tax increase was signed into law. Burgess, 97

U.S. at 384. The Court held that the imposition of the additional tax would
constitute a criminal punishment or penalty, noting that "the ex post facto effect of a law cannot be evaded by giving a civil form to that which is essentially
criminal." Id. at 384-85. The force of this penalty analogy has since been de-

flated by statements of the Court in Welch v. Henry. There the Court noted that
taxation could not be considered a penalty assessed against the taxpayer.
Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 146-47 (1938). See infra note 68 for further
discussion of Welch.
48. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
49. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. "No State shall ... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of the law . . . ." Id.
50. Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531, 542 (1927).
51. Id. at 532.
52. Id. at 539.
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the Fifth Amendment. 5 3
3. Interference with Contracts
A third ground for finding retroactive taxes unconstitutional is
the Constitution's prohibition of laws which interfere with private
contracts. 54 Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 of the Constitution forbids the States from passing any law "impairing the obligation of
contracts." 5 5 Since retroactive taxation may change the benefits
parties have received from a fully consummated contract, the Con56
stitution may prohibit retroactive tax statutes.
Despite some early judicial success of the contract impairment
argument,5 7 the case of Welch v. Henry significantly weakened the
theory that retroactive taxation may impair preexisting contracts. 58 In Welch, the Supreme Court upheld against constitutional attack a Wisconsin revenue statute which reached back two
years to tax previously untaxed corporate dividends. 5 9 In holding
that the statute did not violate the Contract Clause of the Constitution, the Court held that taxation is neither a penalty nor a contract
liability. 60 Although their Contract Clause argument was rejected,
53. Id. at 542.
54. U.S. CONST. art. i, § 10, cl. 1.
55. Id. By definition, this constitutional prohibition applies only to the
states. The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment may protect the taxpayer from contract impairment by federal legislation, but the standard of review in such cases is "less searching." Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A.
Grain & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 733 (1984). Moreover, the United States Supreme
Court has held that the two principles are not coextensive. Id.
56. Coolidge v. Long, 282 U.S. 582 (1931).
57. See, e.g., id. In Long, the State of Massachusetts attempted to tax the
same family that the federal government had tried to tax in Nichols v. Coolidge.
Id. Yet Mrs. Coolidge again managed to beat back the Taxman from her grave,
this time on both contract impairment and due process grounds. Id. at 595-96.
After the death of Mr. Coolidge several years following the death of his wife, the
state of Massachusetts attempted to tax the sons who had succeeded to the family trust. Id. at 593-94. While the questionable tax statute had been passed
prior to the death of Mr. and Mrs. Coolidge, the trust had been created before
the tax statute was passed. Id. at 594-95. The United States Supreme Court
held that the trust deeds were contracts which were impaired by the subsequent tax legislation. Id. at 595. Since it was retroactively applied to a fully
consummated gift (the trust), the tax was held equally unconstitutional as a
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 59596.
58. Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938).
59. Id. at 146.
60. Id. The Court's statement is an often cited passage in many cases justifying retroactive taxation:
Taxation is neither a penalty imposed on the taxpayer nor a liability which
he assumes by contract. It is but a way of apportioning the cost of government among those who in some measure are privileged to enjoy its benefits
and must bear its burdens. Since no citizen enjoys immunity from that
burden, its retroactive imposition does not necessarily infringe due process
Id. at 146-47. It should be noted, however, that the Court spoke only of taxation
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that the tax dethe taxpayers in Welch alternatively maintained
61
nied them equal protection of the laws.
4. The Equal Protection Clause
However, the United States Supreme Court in Welch held that
the retroactive operation of the Wisconsin revenue statute did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,6 2 another constitutional provision which may protect taxpayThe Fourteenth Amendment
ers from retroactive taxation.
precludes a State from denying "to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."6 3 Equal protection concerns

arise when taxes are applied retroactively because such legislation,
in effect, gives lawmakers hindsight.6 4 Lawmakers, armed with
knowledge of who made what and how it was made in previous
years, can target specific groups and individuals when designing
retroactive tax statutes.6 5 These targeted groups may then very
rightly question whether they have been given equal protection of
the laws.
The Court in Welch apparently found this argument unconvincing, as it set forth a broad test which virtually any retroactive tax
statute would pass. 6 6 The test in determining whether a retroactive tax fails to provide equal protection involves asking whether
the object of the tax "falls within a distinct class which may rationally be treated differently from other classes." 67 Since the statute

in question in Welch taxed only recipients of corporate dividends
who had never previously been taxed on such receipts, the tax was
generally. The possibility that retroactive taxation may, indeed, be either a
penalty or a contract liability is not completely foreclosed by the Court's
statements.
61. Id. at 145.
62. Id.
63. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Although this provision is not directly applicable to the federal government, the United States Supreme Court has found

that actions of the federal government which would violate the Equal Protection Clause if taken by a state violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (finding that
District of Columbia segregation laws violate due process and noting that,

although the Fifth Amendment does not contain an equal protection clause, due
process and equal protection are not mutually exclusive).
64. Hochman, supra note 14, at 693.
65. Id.
66. Welch, 305 U.S. at 145.

67. Id. Thus, the standard is the same "arbitrary and capricious" standard
used in due process analysis. Id.
It is a commonplace that the equal protection clause does not require a

state to maintain rigid rules of equal taxation, to resort to close distinctions, or to maintain a precise scientific uniformity. Possible differences in
tax burdens, not shown to be substantial, or which are based on discrimina-

tion not shown to be arbitraryor capricious,do not fall within the constitutional prohibition.
Id. (emphasis added).
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not "hostile or oppressive discrimination" so as to deny equal protection. 68 While the argument has not succeeded in convincing the
Court that retroactive taxes deny equal protection, this inability of
the taxpayer to avoid the retroactive tax has also led to charges
that retroactive taxes are unconstitutional as unapportioned direct
taxes.
5.

UnapportionedDirect Tax

Retroactive taxes may also be unapportioned direct taxes in violation of rule of apportionment. 69 Taxes become unavoidable
when Congress assesses them retroactively, and these taxes may
70
then be direct taxes, not taxes on previous events or privileges.
Further, after a certain length of time, taxpayers should be able to
71
feel secure that they have paid all taxes due on their income.
capital, which, if
When all taxes have been paid, income becomes 72
apportioned.
be
must
and
directly
taxed
is
taxed,
However, the Supreme Court of the United States has never
adopted the view that a retroactive tax is an unapportioned direct
tax. In Milliken v. United States, a taxpayer challenged a retroactive estate tax as an unapportioned direct tax. 73 The decedent in
Milliken had made a gift to his children three years before he
died. 74 When the decedent died, the tax collector held the gift to be
a gift in contemplation of death. 75 The collector then included the
value of the gift in the taxable estate and taxed the gift at the current rates, which were higher than the rates in effect at the time of
the gift.7 6 The United States Supreme Court held that the increased tax was still a tax on an event (the giving of a gift) and not
an unapportioned direct tax. 77 In addition, the Court found that
Congress' need to prevent evasion of estate taxes by deathbed gift68. Id. at 146. The decision in Welch was by no means unanimous. Three

United States Supreme Court justices and three justices of the Wisconsin

Supreme Court agreed with the trial judge that the controversial act was unconstitutional. Id. at 154 n.8. The dissenting United States Supreme Court
justices in Welch thought the act violated the Equal Protection Clause because
it reached back two years into the past to place the complete burden of an emergency tax on a small group of select taxpayers. Id. As such, the selection of
these unfortunate taxpayers amounted to "arbitrary and discriminatory classification" which denied these citizens equal protection of the laws. Id. at 157.
69. See, e.g., Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 557
(1895).
70. See generally Ballard, supra note 28, at 595.
71. See generally Laurens Williams, Retroactivity in the Federal Tax Field,

U. S. CAL. L. SCH. TAX INST. 79, 81-82 (1960).
72. Id.
73. Milliken v. United States, 283 U.S. 15 (1931).
74. Id. at 18.
75. Id. at 19.
76. Id. The gift was made when the Revenue Act of 1916 was in force but
was later taxed at the higher rate provided in the Revenue Act of 1918. Id.
77. Id. at 24. The Court held that "a mere increase in the tax, pursuant to a
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giving justified the retroactivity. 78

Thus, Milliken illustrates that
Congress may justify retroactivity in response to constitutional attacks on such taxes.

C. PermissibleRetroactivity
When a taxpayer challenges a retroactive tax statute on constitutional grounds, the Federal government may, in response, justify
any alleged unconstitutional retroactivity on numerous grounds.
Such retroactivity is often justified as being necessary for the efficient collection of revenue and the smooth operation of government. 79 Thus, retroactive statutes which are "curative" in effect
will generally withstand constitutional attack.8 0 Such "curative
statutes" may range in effect from those which merely correct technical errors in the tax code to those which close unintended "loopholes." 8 ' A second justification for the limited retroactivity of a tax
statute is that such retroactivity is necessary to eliminate taxpayer
evasion of the statute while it is in the process on enactment.8 2 Finally, Congress is obviously free to retroactively apply tax provi83
sions which benefit the taxpayer.
policy of which the donor was forewarned at the time he elected to exercise the
privilege, did not change its character." Id.
78. Milliken v. United States, 283 U.S. 15, 24 (1931).

79. See, e.g., Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509, 515 (1899). In Nicol the Supreme
Court stated:
The power to tax is the one great power upon which the whole national
fabric is based. It is as necessary to the existence and prosperity of a nation as is the air he breathes to the natural man. It is not only the power to
destroy, but it is also the power to keep alive.
Id.; see United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292, 297 (1981) (holding that retroactive tax legislation is allowable for "short and limited periods required by
the practicalities of producing national legislation" and that such retroactivity
is "customary congressional practice"); Ekins v. Commissioner, 797 F.2d 481,
485 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that "Congress cannot be left powerless to carry out
the yearly tinkering with the [Internal Revenue] Code that is necessary to prevent losses of revenue and secure the national fiscal goal."); see also Ballard,
supra note 28, at 596 (noting that legislation involving the "machinery of administration of the taxing system" is generally unobjectionable).
80. See generally Ballard, supra note 28, at 596.

81. For further discussion of permissible retroactivity in this area, see infra
notes 84-101 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717
(1984) (upholding legislation which was retroactively applied to employers who
had withdrawn from pensions while the new legislation was pending).
83. Cf United States v. Hemme, 476 U.S. 558 (1986) (upholding against
due process attack a retroactive tax statute which resulted in a net gain to the
taxpayer).
Congress has been permitted to retroactively apply tax statutes in a limited
number of other situations. An emergency or overriding public policy may also
justify retroactivity in certain situations. See, e.g., Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32 (1940) (upholding the retroactive application of depression measures designed to prevent the collapse of the building-and-loan
industry).
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1. Curative Statutes
One type of tax legislation which does not often raise constitutional concerns is curative legislation which corrects defects in prior
tax enactments. 8 4 Such legislation may range from statutes which
merely correct technical errors (such as clerical or typographical er6
8
rors)8 5 to statutes that close unintended loopholes in the tax code.

Courts often justify such retroactivity on the basis that "constitutional principles must leave some play to the joints of the
84. Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Board of Comm'rs, 258 U.S. 338 (1922) (acknowledging that retroactive curative legislation is allowable to correct minor
technical errors).

The United States Supreme Court has also upheld curative statutes which

ratify prior acts of Congress. See Ballard, supra note 28, at 596. Under this
theory, Congress may retroactively ratify the prior unlawful collection of taxes
without fear of offending the Constitution. United States v. Heinszen & Co.,
206 U.S. 370, 382 (1907). This retroactive ratification of taxes is allowable only
where Congress had the power to levy the taxes in the first place. Id. In
Heinszen, the United States Supreme Court found nothing wrong with a 1906
act of Congress which ratified previous unauthorized collections of duties in the
Philippines. Id. An order of the President, dated July 12, 1898, called for the
collection of duties on imports to the Philippines. Id. at 378. Since the President had no power to levy taxes, the prior collections were illegal. Id. at 382.
The corporation in Heinszen had filed for a refund before the 1906 act of Congress had been passed to ratify the unlawful collections. Id. at 378. The corporation claimed that the elimination of the refund was a denial of due process
under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 386. The Court held that as long as Congress had the power to lay the tax when it was originally collected there was no
constitutional bar to the retroactive ratification of the tax. Id. at 382. The
Court declared that Congress had the power to "cure irregularities, and confirm
proceedings which, without the confirmation, would be void, because unauthorized, provided such confirmation does not interfere with intervening rights."
Id. at 384 (citing Mattingly v. District of Columbia, 97 U.S. 687, 690 (1878)).

However, this doctrine of ratification may not be used, under the guise of
curative legislation, to retroactively validate an act which remains unlawful at
the time of ratification. Forbes, 258 U.S. at 339. In Forbes,the State of Florida
had attempted to ratify the defendant Board's collection of tolls for prior
passages through a canal, which were free at the time the passages were made.
Id. at 338. The plaintiff had traveled through the canal free of charge until
1917, when a toll was imposed on such passages. Id. The plaintiff had, upon
demand by the defendant, paid the Board for use of the canal prior to 1917. Id.
The Florida legislature attempted to ratify the actions of the Board in 1919. Id.
The United States Supreme Court held that ratification presupposes the power
to do the antecedent act. Id. at 339. Since the Florida legislature never had the
power to retroactively tax an event which was untaxed when undertaken, it
could not subsequently ratify the illegal collection of the tolls. Such an attempt
was held to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Justice Holmes analogized
the Florida legislature's attempt to force the plaintiff to pay for passages free
when made to an attempt to "ma[ke] a man pay a baker for a gratuitous deposit
of rolls." Id.
85. See Williams, supra note 71, at 103 (noting the Technical Amendments
Act of 1958).
86. See Graham & Foster v. Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409 (1931). But see Carlton
v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding unconstitutional the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 with respect to a provision which retroactively closed
an estate tax deduction for proceeds from a sale of securities to an Employee
Stock Ownership Plan), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 55 (1993).
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machine."8 7
Thus, when a legislative mistake gives a taxpayer a right to
recover money from the Government, Congress may retroactively
eliminate this right with a curative statute.8 8 In Graham & Foster
v. Goodcell, the Supreme Court found the Revenue Act of 1928 constitutional despite its retroactive operation.8 9 The Act in question
eliminated a right of refund which had accrued to taxpayers as a
result of an erroneous statutory interpretation by the Treasury Department. 90 The Court held that a "curative statute aptly designed
to remedy mistakes and defects in the administration of government" did not violate due process when retroactively applied. 9 1
The Supreme Court of the United States will decide in early
1994 whether the taxpayer should always be expected to bear the
cost of Congressional miscues when the taxpayer has relied to his
detriment on the legislative oversight. 9 2 On October 4, 1993, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the case of
Carlton v. United States,93 a case which will likely influence how
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 fares in court. In
Carlton, the plaintiff, as executor of an estate, had purchased a
large share of stock which he later sold to an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP).94 He undertook such actions in reliance on an
estate tax deduction promulgated in the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 95
To promote ESOPs, Congress had allowed an estate tax deduction
96
for the value of stock sold at a substantial discount to an ESOP.

Carlton relied on the incentive, bought a large quantity of MCI
87. Forbes, 258 U.S. at 340.
88. Graham,282 U.S. at 429-30. Notice, however, that no taxpayer reliance
is involved in this scenario. The existence of taxpayer reliance on a legislative
mistake changes the situation markedly. See Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1059.
89. Graham & Foster, 282 U.S. at 429-30.
90. Id. at 417-18. An earlier Supreme Court decision held that the five-year
statute of limitations in the Revenue Act of 1918 applied to collections by distraint. Id. at 417. The Treasury Department had been erroneously interpreting the statute as not applicable to such collections. Id. When the Court's
decision had been announced, taxpayers began filing for refunds for taxes paid
after the statute of limitations had run. Id. at 415. The Act of 1928 retroactively denied all such refunds. Id. at 416-17.
91. Id. at 429. The Court conditioned its approval of such curative statutes
on a showing that "the remedy can be applied without injustice." Id.

A curative enactment may, subject to the conditions in Graham & Foster,
nullify rights vested due to the defect or even rights settled by prior litigation.
See Ballard, supra note 28, at 596 (citing Graham & Foster and Rafferty v.
Smith, Bell & Co., 257 U.S. 226 (1921)).
92. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1051 (finding unconstitutional the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 with respect to a provision which retroactively closed an estate tax deduction for proceeds from a sale of securities to an Employee Stock Ownership
Plan).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1053-54.

95. Id.
96. Id. at 1053.
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stock, and then sold it to an ESOP at a loss to the estate of
$631,000.

97

By way of a "Congressional Clarification," Congress retroactively limited this deduction so that it was only available to estates
where the decedent actually owned the stock before he died. 98 Congress took this action because the tax deduction had resulted in
more revenue loss than Congress originally anticipated. 99 Since
Carlton, and not the decedent, had purchased the stock, the estate
incurred a loss of $631,000.100 The Ninth Circuit held that a curative statute, retroactively applied, violates due process when there
has been reasonable detrimental reliance on the legislative
blunder.101

2. Evasion
Tax statutes applied retroactively to prevent evasion by the
taxpayer during the enactment process are also generally immune
from constitutional attack.1 0 2 In Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.
A. Gray & Co., the United States Supreme Court upheld the retroactive application of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments
Act (MPPAA) of 1980.103 Under the MPPAA, Congress required
employers to pay a sum of money to the Government if the employer withdrew from a pension plan.10 4 Congress applied the act
retroactively to the five-month period preceding final passage of the
Act because many employers, such as the plaintiff, had withdrawn
from pension funds during that period to avoid the mandatory contribution.1 0 5 The Supreme Court held that such a tax statute, retroactively applied to prevent evasion by the taxpayer during the
interim period between proposal and enactment, did not violate due
process. 106
97.
98.
99.
100.

Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1053-54.
Id. at 1054-55.
Id. at 1055.
Id. at 1053-55.

101. Id. at 1059. In addition, the taxpayer must have had neither actual or

constructive notice of the impending change at the time he acted in reliance.
For a further discussion of the principles of notice, see infra notes 170-204.
The plaintiff in Carlton had argued in district court that the Act also violated the Contract Clause and the Takings Clause of the Constitution, but he
did not contest these points on appeal. Id. at 1055.
102. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717
(1984) (upholding legislation which was retroactively applied to employers who
had withdrawn from pensions while the new legislation was pending).

103. Id.
104. Id. at 725.
105. Id. at 723.
106. Id. at 734. The Court also rejected the claim that the Act violated the
Contract Clause of the Constitution by noting that the Contract Clause was
never intended to apply to the National Government. Id. at 733.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 27:775

3. Relief Measures

While in some instances it may be unconstitutional to increase
taxpayer's burden retroactively, Congress is certainly free to retroactively grant tax relief 1 0 7 For example, in Commissioner v. Estate
of Church'0 the Supreme Court of the United States held that the
value of a trust could be included in the settlor's taxable estate
where the settlor retains a life income from the trust.'0 9 The Technical Changes Act of 1949 reversed the decision in Estate of Church
and provided relief to individuals who had created such trusts. 110
Since the act benefited the taxpayers, no taxpayer challenged the
constitutionality of these retroactive relief measures. 1 '
II.

DUE PROCESS -

THE MODERN DAY TEST

Since 1980, the United States Supreme Court has entertained
only three cases where the constitutionality of retroactive tax legislation was the central issue. 112 All three indicate that the Supreme
Court considers due process the only remaining viable ground on
which to attack retroactive taxes. 1 3 However, these decisions only
107. See Williams, supra note 71, at 100. Williams includes within this cate-

gory legislation which lessens a tax burden imposed by prior enactments or legislation which provides relief by overruling a court decision unfavorable to the
taxpayer by statute. Id.
108. Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1949).
109. Id. at 651.
110. See Williams, supra note 71, at 100 n.50.
111. In addition to retroactive tax relief, retroactivity in tax legislation has
been permitted in certain other situations. The existence of an emergency or
overriding public policy considerations may justify the retroactive legislation.
Veix.v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32 (1940) (upholding the retroactive application of depression measures designed to prevent the collapse of
the building-and-loan industry).
In Veix, the United States Supreme Court upheld the retroactive application of certain Depression-era legislation. Id. The legislation in question limited the right to withdraw funds from building-and-loan associations due to the
imminent collapse of those institutions. Id. at 37. The United States Supreme
Court held that the interest in preserving the credit system outweighed the
public's interest in prospective legislation. Id. at 38. See also Home Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (rejecting the argument that retroactive depression measures constituted an impairment of contracts when an
emergency existed).
Chief Justice Hughes in Blaisdell stated that the "policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government by
virtue of which contractual relations are worth while .... " Id. at 435. By its
very nature, however, this "emergency exception" should rarely be necessary.
112. United States v. Hemme, 476 U.S. 558 (1986); Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984); United States v. Darusmont, 449
U.S. 292 (1981).
113. See Darusmont,449 U.S. at 298. In Darusmont,the Court reiterated its
holding in Welch that taxation cannot be considered a contract liability or a
penalty. Id.; see supra note 60 for a further discussion of this view. Such a
statement would seem to restrict attacks on ex post facto or contract impairment grounds.
Retroactive tax legislation is still occasionally attacked (usually unsuccess-
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offered vague guidance as to when the retroactive imposition of
taxes offends due process. This section first examines the three
most recent cases in which the Supreme Court of the United States
has squarely confronted the issue of retroactive taxation. This section then summarizes how the Court determines whether a retroactive tax statute violates due process. Lastly, this section suggests a
more consistent approach which should be followed when analyzing
retroactive tax enactments for due process violations.
A. Recent Cases Involving Retroactive Taxation
The three most recent cases which have dealt with the consti1 14
tutionality of retroactive taxes are United States v. Darusmont,
115
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co.,
and United
States v. Hemme. 116 In Darusmont, the Supreme Court upheld a
retroactive tax statute by focusing on the statute's effects on the
taxpayer. 117 In Gray, the Court shifted its focus to the Congressional justifications for the retroactivity in upholding the challenged tax legislation. 118 In Hemme, the Court shifted its focus
back to the legislation's effect on the taxpayer to again uphold a
retroactive tax statute. 119
In United States v. Darusmont, the Court held that a tax statute retroactively applied to the first of the calendar year in which
the statute was enacted would not per se violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 120 In Darusmont, the plaintiffs
challenged the constitutionality of a provision of the Tax Reform
Act of 1976 which increased the amount of tax on the sale of the
plaintiffs' home. 12 1 The Act was signed into law on October 4, 1976,
and made retroactive to January 1, 1976, thereby covering the
plaintiffs' July home sale. 1 2 2 The taxpayers set forth three factors
which they asserted as relevant when deciding if a retroactive tax
violates due process: whether the taxpayer has notice of the change
at the time of the transaction; whether, if the taxpayer had been
fully) as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Licari v. Commissioner, 946 F.2d 690 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that the retroactive increase in a
monetary penalty for questionable deductions did not deny equal protection).
114. Darusmont, 449 U.S. at 292.
115. Gray, 467 U.S. at 717.
116. Hemme, 476 U.S. at 558.
117. Darusmont,449 U.S. at 299-301.

118. Gray, 467 U.S. at 728-31.
119. Hemme, 476 U.S. at 568-72.
120. Darusmont, 449 U.S. at 297.
121. Id. at 295. The tax in question was the minimum tax, a type of income
tax applied to items of preference in the tax code. Id. at 294.
122. Id. at 294-95. Mr. Darusmont had been transferred by his employer.
Id. at 293. Under the tax laws which existed at the time of the sale of his house,
he owed no minimum tax on the sale of the house. Id. at 294. The retroactive
application of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 resulted in a minimum tax liability of
$2280. Id. at 295.
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given notice, he could have altered his behavior accordingly; and
whether the tax was a new tax or just a rate change of an existing
tax.

1 23

However, the Court entertained the three factors suggested by
the plaintiffs simply for the sake of argument, leaving their importance largely unsettled. 12 4 The Court held that retroactivity was
permissible, at least with respect to income tax statutes, to cover
transactions made during the enactment process or even those
5
made within the calendar year in which the statute was enacted. 12
The Court found that notice, even if relevant, existed since the
changes in question had been under discussion for over a year prior
to the Act's passage. 12 6 Further, the Court distinguished the case
before it from earlier gift tax cases that had suggested that the taxpayer's ability to alter his behavior, given notice of a change, was
relevant to due process analysis. 12 7 Finally, the Court held, again
assuming relevance, that the plaintiffs failed their own "new tax"
test since the tax in question was merely a change in an existing
tax.'

28

123. Id. at 299. The Supreme Court seems to have assumed the test to be
whether a tax is "so harsh and oppressive as to be a denial of due process." Id.
Such language echoes statements made in Welch v. Henry that a retroactive tax
must be "so harsh and oppressive as to transgress the constitutional limitation." Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147 (1938).
124. Darusmont,449 U.S. at 299-300. The Court simply did not consider the
taxpayer's ability to alter his behavior because the plaintiffs had cited old gift
tax cases for this proposition. Id. at 299. This ability of a taxpayer may not be
a relevant factor anyway, at least in respect to income taxes, because, even if a
taxpayer knows of a change in income tax rates, it can be assumed he would not
refuse to receive the income. Hochman, supra note 14, at 706-07. Thus, there
can be no reliance by the taxpayer on the prior income tax rates. Id. at 707.
As for notice, the Court in Darusmont simply assumed it was relevant "for
purposes of argument." Darusmont,449 U.S. at 299. The only discussion of the
third factor, the "new tax" argument, simply rebutted the plaintiffs' assertion
that the tax in question was a new tax. Id. at 300.
While most of the Court's discussion in Darusmont focused on the statute's
effect on the taxpayer, the determinative factor in the case was actually the
time span of the retroactivity of the statute in question. Id. at 296-97.
As respects income tax statutes it long has been the practice of Congress to
make them retroactive for relatively short periods so as to include profits
from transactions consummated while the statute was in process of enactment, or within so much of the calendar year as preceded the enactment;
and repeated decisions of this Court have recognized this practice and sustained it as consistent with the due process clause of the Constitution.
Id. at 297-98 (quoting United States v. Hudson, 299 U.S. 498, 500 (1937)).
125. Darusmont, 449 U.S. at 297-98.
126. Id. at 299. The Court stated that the proposed changes had been "under
public discussion" for over a year before enactment. Id. For a discussion of
notice, and this broad phraseology in particular, see infra notes 170-204 and
accompanying text.
127. Darusmont, 449 U.S. at 299. Plaintiffs cited Blodgett v. Holden, 275
U.S. 142 (1927), modified, 276 U.S. 594 (1928), and Untermyer v. Anderson,
276 U.S. 440 (1928). See supra note 12 for a discussion of these cases.
128. Darusmont,449 U.S. at 300. The minimum tax had been in force since
1969, and the 1976 changes merely decreased the amount of exemption and
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In the next case that the Court confronted the issue of retroactive taxation, the Court shifted its focus from the effects on the taxpayer to the purpose of the legislation. In Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 12 9 the Court held that the Multiemployer

Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 did not violate due process
where it was applied retroactively to eliminate taxpayer evasion
during the enactment process. 130 The Court went on to broadly
hold that tax legislation does not violate due process where its reton a "legitimate legislative purpose
roactive application is based 13
1
furthered by rational means."
Gray, however, virtually eliminated the taxpayer from the due
process equation. Whereas in Darusmont the Court at least addressed the concerns of the taxpayer, Gray looked solely to the Congressional justification for the retroactive application of the
legislation. 13 2 After Gray, retroactive tax statutes must only pass
the amorphous "legitimate legislative purpose/rational means" test
133
to pass constitutional muster.
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court's emphasis on

increased the tax rate. Id. The Court distinguished the plaintiffs from one who
"has no reason to suppose that any transactions of the sort will be taxed at all."
Id. (quoting Judge Learned Hand in Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 545
(2d Cir. 1930)).
129. See surpa notes 102-106 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
case.
130. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984).
131. Id. at 729. The Court stated: It is now well established that legislative
Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come to the Court with
a presumption of constitutionality, and that the burden is on one complaining of
a due process violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an arbi-

trary and irrational way. Id. (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428

U.S. 1, 15 (1976)).
132. The Court again rejected a test which emphasized the concerns of the
taxpayer. The Court rejected the test set forth in Nachman Corp. v. Pension

Benefit Guaranty Corp., which examined four factors when analyzing retroactive legislation: reliance by the parties; the amount of prior legislative activity
in the area; the "equities of imposing the legislative burdens"; and the degree to

which transitional provisions moderate the effects of the legislation. Gray, 467

U.S. at 727 (citing Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 592 F.2d 947
(1979), aftd on statutory grounds, 446 U.S. 359 (1980)).
133. Gray, 467 U.S. at 729. The Court's swing to an emphasis on statutory
justifications is further evidenced by the Court's equating of the old, taxpayer-

oriented due process test (whether the statute is "harsh and oppressive") to the

more recent, legislation-oriented due process test (whether the statute is "arbitrary and irrational"). Id. at 733 (citing Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147
(1938), and Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 15).
The Court did, however, again suggest in dicta that notice might be important, the point again being mooted by the existence of ample notice in the case
before the Court. Gray, 467 U.S. at 732. The Court found abundant notice
"even assuming that advance notice of legislative action with retrospective effects is constitutionally compelled." Id. (relying on United States v. Darusmont,

449 U.S. 292, 299 (1981), where a similar assumption was made). Gray, 467
U.S. at 732. The Court held that employers were on notice of the impending

change since several proposals which were debated before enactment of the MPPAA had retroactive effective dates. Id.
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the Congressional justifications for retroactive legislation was
short-lived. The Court soon shifted its focus back to the taxpayer in
United States v. Hemme.13 4 In Hemme, the Court held that the
retroactive application of a tax statute did not offend due process
where the taxpayer suffered no net detriment from the retroactive
enactment.' 3 5 The taxpayer in Hemme had claimed that the Tax
Reform Act of 1976 violated due process because the Act had reduced his tax deduction based on gifts made prior to the statute. 136
However, the taxpayer actually paid less tax under the new "unified credit" system created by the Act. 137 Once again, the Court's
focus was on the statute's effect on the taxpayer, specifically
whether "without notice, a statute gives a different and more op138
pressive legal effect" to prior actions of the taxpayer.
134. United States v. Hemme, 476 U.S. 558 (1986).
135. Id. at 571.
136. Id. at 561. Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the estate and gift taxes
were separate and distinct taxes. Id. at 560. A taxpayer had been allowed a
$30,000 lifetime deduction on gifts made during his lifetime, which the taxpayer could claim at any point in his life. Id. Taxpayers were also able to
deduct $60,000 from the value of their estates before paying an estate tax. Id.

The Act eliminated these two deductions but allowed instead a "unified credit"
intended to make up for the lost deductions. Id. at 560-61. The transitional
rule in question reduced the unified credit which a taxpayer could claim by 20%
of the gifts claimed under the old gift tax deduction. Id. at 562. The Court
assumed for the sake of argument that the statute in controversy was a form of
retroactive taxation. Id. at 571.

The taxpayer, and the District Court, had relied on Untermyer v. Anderson.
Id. at 567. The District Court held that the statute was arbitrary and capricious because it affected "the final 'disposition of a gift made before the enact-

ment of the statute."

Id.

The Supreme Court, however, distinguished

Untermyer on the basis that Untermyer involved the retroactive imposition of
the very first gift tax without notice to the taxpayer. Id. at 568.
137. Id. at 570. The taxpayer had claimed his $30,000 lifetime gift tax exemption but had died within three years of the gift. Id. at 563. The value of the
gift, presumptively a gift made in contemplation of death, was then required to
be included in the value of the estate for estate tax purposes. Id. The estate
then claimed the new unified credit, from which the Internal Revenue Service
deducted 20% of the value of the gifts previously made. Id. The 20% reduction
in exemption did not, however, outweigh the benefit to the taxpayer and the
estate of being able to claim both the lifetime gift tax exemption and the unified
credit. Id. at 571.
138. Id. at 569. Almost hidden in the Court's statement was the apparent
recognition of notice (of the taxpayer of the impending changes) as a factor to be
considered when assessing the constitutionality of retroactive taxes. Id. Yet
notice was not even vital to the Court's decision in Hemme. Id. The Court
never reached the question of notice, assumedly because the taxpayer was not
found to have suffered a detriment as a result of the enactment. Id. Clearly,
the Court's due process analysis focused primarily on the statute's effects on the
taxpayer rather than the Congressional justification of the legislation. Id. at
571. Possibly, had the Court found that the taxpayer in Hemme had suffered a
detriment from the enactment and that the taxpayer had not been given any
notice of the questionable legislation, it might have then considered the legislative reasons for passing the statute.
The Court also considered the character of the tax and the circumstances
surrounding its enactment to be important in its decision. Id. at 569-70. "We
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Summary of the Current ConstitutionalTest Applied to
Retroactive Taxes

These modern cases, as well as some of the older Supreme
Court cases dealing with retroactive tax legislation, have provided
only vague guidance as to when such retroactive tax enactments
are unconstitutional. The Court has consistently examined the "nature of the tax and the circumstances in which it is laid" when testing the constitutionality of such enactments. 139 On the one hand,
the Court examines the statute's effect on the taxpayer: a "harsh
and oppressive" effect on the taxpayer will result in a finding of
unconstitutionality. 140 On the other hand, the Court evaluates the
legislative justifications for the retroactive legislation: the Government will prevail where it can show a "legitimate legislative pur14 1
pose furthered by a rational means."
Yet these standards vary with the "nature of the tax" which
Congress seeks to retroactively increase. 142 The courts will allow
greater retroactive effect for income taxes than for gift and estate
taxes. 14 3 In the gift and estate tax areas, the prior gift or the death
of the taxpayer has usually ended the control of the taxpayer over
the taxable event." 4 In these types of cases, the taxpayer may
have taken different actions if he had known of the increased tax
rate. 45 In contrast, a taxpayer would not likely refuse to receive
income even if he knew that Congress would retroactively apply
rate increases.1 46 Thus, the Supreme Court of the United States
must 'consider the nature of the tax and the circumstances in which it is laid
before it can be said that its retroactive application is so harsh and oppressive
as to transgress the constitutional limitation.'" Id. (quoting Welch v. Henry,
305 U.S. 134, 147 (1938)). While not dispositive, the amount of the tax is a

relevant factor in assessing the tax and its effect on the taxpayer. Hemme, 476
U.S. at 571.
139. Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
granted, 114 S. Ct. 55 (1993) (citing Hemme, 476 U.S. at 568-69 (quoting Welch
v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147 (1938)); accord United States v. Darusmont, 449

U.S. 292, 299 (1981) (per curiam)).
140. Welch, 305 U.S. at 147. "In each case it is necessary to consider the
nature of the tax and the circumstances in which it is laid before it can be said
that its retroactive application is so harsh and oppressive as to transgress the
constitutional limitation." Id. This taxpayer-oriented test was applied in both
Darusmont and Hemme. Darusmont,449 U.S. at 299; Hemme, 476 U.S. at 56869.
141. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729
(1984).
142. Welch, 305 U.S. at 147-48.
143. Hochman, supra note 14, at 706-08; see also Welch, 305 U.S. at 147-48.
144. Cf Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147 (1927). "It seems wholly unreasonable that one who, in entire good faith and without the slightest premonition of such consequence, made absolute disposition of his property by gifts
should thereafter be required to pay a charge for so doing." Id.
145. Hochman, supra note 14, at 706-07.
146. See Welch, 305 U.S. at 147-48 (distinguishing an income tax on corporate dividends from a gift tax and finding the income tax constitutional despite
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has allowed a greater degree of retroactivity in the income tax area
47
than in the gift and estate tax areas.'
C. A Suggested Approach
The courts must view retroactive tax statutes from two vantage
points when analyzing such enactments for due process violations.
Courts must first analyze the statute from the viewpoint of the taxpayer. 145 Under this taxpayer-oriented approach, courts must consider the following two factors: (1) whether the taxpayer reasonably
relied to his detriment on the existing law;14 9 and (2) whether the
taxpayer had notice (either actual or constructive) of the retroactively-imposed change: 150 A third factor, the taxpayer's ability to
alter his conduct if he had notice of the retroactive change, if analyzed at all, should be weighed in a manner opposite of the way

courts currently treat this factor. 151 Secondly, courts must weigh
the statute's effect on the taxpayer against the legislative justifications for the retroactive enactment. 1 5 2 This legislature-oriented
approach takes into account the government's need to raise revenue
by examining the purpose of the statute and the rationality of its
retroactive application.
1.

The Taxpayer's Concerns

a.

Was There Reasonable Detrimental Reliance by the Taxpayer
15 3
on the Prior Law?
The taxpayer must initially meet a threshold requirement

the fact that it reached back two years to tax income). "We cannot assume that
stockholders would refuse to receive corporate dividends even if they knew that
their receipt would later be subjected to a new tax or to the increase of an old
one." Id.; see also Hochman, supra note 14, at 706-07 (noting that the courts
assume that a taxpayer would not refuse income even if he knew it would be
subjected to a higher tax rate).
147. Welch, 305 U.S. at 147-48.
148. See generally Rule of Prospectivity, supra note 11, at 439. The Note
suggests balancing the taxpayer's reliance against the government's purpose in
making a tax statute retroactive. Id.
149. See Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
granted, 114 S. Ct. 55 (1993).
150. Id. But see Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S.
717, 731-32 (1984) (doubting that the retroactive pension act in question would
have violated due process "even if it was suddenly enacted by Congress without
any period of deliberate consideration . . ").
151. See Welch, 305 U.S. at 147-48 (finding it unlikely that a citizen would
refuse to receive corporate dividends even if he knew the tax rate would soon be
raised).
152. Cf Gray, 467 U.S. at 729 ("Provided that the retroactive application of a
statute is supported by a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by a rational
means, judgments about the wisdom of such legislation remain within the exclusive province of the legislative and executive branches . . . .") See generally
Rule of Prospectivity, supra note 11, at 439.
153. The action of the government in many retroactive tax cases, if taken by
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before the court need even continue due process analysis. The complaining taxpayer must first show that he has suffered a detriment
as a result of the retroactive tax legislation.' 5 4 By definition, there
can be no Fifth Amendment due process violation without the deprivation of "life, liberty, or property." 155 This "detriment threshold," therefore, allows the government to retroactively provide relief
or confer benefits upon taxpayers 156 but does not allow such retroactivity where it detrimentally affects the taxpayer. Formerly, the
Supreme Court has found due process violations where a retroactive tax statute has a "harsh and oppressive" effect on the taxpayer. 15 7 Perhaps realizing that the Fifth Amendment does not
require a "harsh and oppressive" deprivation, the Court has since
equated that standard with the prohibition of arbitrary and irrational laws. 158 While the amount of the detriment need not be
one citizen against another, would give rise to a cause of action for negligent
misrepresentation. Negligent misrepresentation generally requires a false
representation, negligently made with the intent to induce reliance, resulting in
justifiable, detrimental reliance by the plaintiff. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 105, at 728, 107, at 745 (5th ed.
1984). These elements often appear in retroactive tax cases. The false
representation is usually in the form of a loophole that was negligently
designed or drafted to allow more revenue loss than Congress originally
anticipated. Such tax laws are obviously intended to induce reliance by the
taxpayer, especially where tax incentives are used to induce the taxpayer to
make socially desirable transactions. The taxpayer justifiably relies to his
detriment when he makes such transactions at a cost, only later to find out that
the loophole has been closed retroactively.
Carlton is a perfect example of the negligent misrepresentation analogy.
Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1060. "[The statute in question] was enacted to induce
taxpayers to sell shares at a discounted price to an ESOP, thus furthering the
public policy of employee ownership. As intended, the [plaintiff] succumbed to
the lure .... Then, when the private actor had completed the socially desirable
action ... the government reneged on its end of the deal." Id. It might also be
argued that the government should be estopped from retroactively changing the
tax code when there has been reasonable detrimental reliance by the taxpayer.
Estoppel occurs when a party "is prevented by his own acts from claiming a
right to detriment of the other party who was entitled to rely on such conduct
and has acted accordingly." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 551 (6th ed. 1990).
154. Cf United States v. Hemme, 476 U.S. 558 (1986) (upholding against
due process attack a tax statute which lessened the tax burden on the taxpayer); Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1059 (holding that a taxpayer must reasonably
rely to his detriment on a tax statute before retroactivity will be found harsh
and oppressive). This reliance interest is weaker when the actor is someone
other than the taxpayer, such as the executor of an estate. Ferman v. United
States, 993 F.2d 485, 492 (5th Cir. 1993) (upholding a retroactive curative statute after an executor of an estate had acted in reliance on the mistake). Thus,
more weight should be given to this reliance interest when it is the taxpayer
himself who has acted in reliance on the prior law. Id.
155. U.S. CONST. amend. V. This prohibition applies to the States as well.
156. For a discussion of the justifications for retroactive relief measures, see
notes 107-11 and the accompanying text.
157. Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147 (1938) (holding that a retroactive tax
must have a "harsh and oppressive" effect on the taxpayer before it can be
found to violate due process).
158. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 733
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"harsh and oppressive," the Supreme Court has indicated that the
159
detriment must be a net detriment.
In addition to considering the detriment suffered by the taxpayer, courts must also consider the extent of the taxpayer reliance
160
on the prior tax code when analyzing for due process violations.
In a system such as ours where Congress uses tax incentives to entice taxpayers into taking socially desirable actions, the taxpayer
must feel he can trust the government not to renege on its end of
16 1
If
the bargain when he takes action in reliance on an incentive.
not, the whole tax incentive system breaks down. Congress sets
forth tax laws in particular detail and passes them with knowledge
that taxpayers will rely on these laws to plan their financial affairs. 16 2 The courts must protect this reliance if Congress does not.
Moreover, courts may find taxpayer reliance on the tax code
even where the taxpayer has taken no affirmative action in reliance
on a tax provision. 163 The argument that a taxpayer would blindly
accept income regardless of the rate at which it was being taxed is
over simplistic.' 6 4 A taxpayer may continue to receive income because the current tax rate on such income is tolerable. At some
point this rate may become intolerable and inspire the taxpayer to
defer or expedite his income. 165 However, the courts should not
decide at what point a taxpayer would take such action. 166 That
decision should rest solely with the taxpayer. By holding that the
income recipient would have continued to receive his income de(1984). See also Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976) (rejecting the notion that the Due Process Clause protects any "grievous loss" and holding that
it is the nature of the interest involved rather than its weight which the Due
Process Clause protects).
159. See United States v. Hemme, 476 U.S. 558, 571 (1986). Hemme would
seem to indicate that a taxpayer must suffer an overall detriment as a result of
a retroactive tax statute. Id. Under the statute in Hemme, the taxpayer lost a
$60,000 specific exemption, which would have reduced his estate tax by
$20,400. Id. However, the unified credit established by the statute reduced the
estate's tax by $28,000, and this resulting gain was found to be dispositive. Id.
How far this "net loss" analysis may be extended is unclear; it may be limited to
situations where what is lost and what is gained are closely intertwined so that
every taxpayer who suffers the same loss enjoys the same net benefit. However, problems might arise where, for example, a taxpayer's income tax is
raised retroactively but offset by a more beneficial retroactive gift tax cut. It is
unlikely that the "net loss" requirement would avoid a successful due process
attack on the income tax provision.
160. Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
granted, 114 S. Ct. 55 (1993).
161. Id.
162. See generally Rule of Prospectivity, supra note 11, at 439.
163. Cf Hochman, supra note 14, at 707 (suggesting that the taxpayer has
other options than simply receiving income).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. But cf. Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147-48 (1938) (finding it unlikely
that a citizen would refuse to receive corporate dividends even if he knew the
tax rate would soon be raised).
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spite the retroactively increased rate, the courts make financial decisions for the taxpayer which they have no right to make. Under
certain circumstances, lack of reliance may be plainly obvious. Taxpayer reliance may be absent where the taxpayer acts without
knowledge of the tax law, 167 or where the taxpayer attempts to
claim an "undiscovered benefit" which he claims after having paid a
tax without protest. 168 Thus, courts should begin due process analysis with a presumption of reliance by the taxpayer on prior law,
and the taxpayer's due process argument will be easily overcome
69
only where reliance is plainly lacking.1
b. Was the Taxpayer Given Notice of the Retroactive Tax?
In addition to being detrimental, the taxpayer's reliance on the
tax law must be reasonable under the circumstances. 170 The reasonableness of the reliance is inversely proportional to the amount
of notice given to the taxpayer: the more notice of the impending
retroactive change, the less reasonable the reliance by the taxpayer
on existing law. 1 71 Further, courts should consider both actual and
constructive notice when determining if the taxpayer's reliance
172
was, in fact, reasonable.
Actual notice of an impending change in the tax laws makes
taxpayer reliance on the existing code unreasonable. 1 73 Yet it is
equally unreasonable to assume that the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment requires the government to provide citizens with
167. See generally Rule of Prospectivity, supra note 11, at 439.
168. See United States v. Wells Fargo, 485 U.S. 351 (1988). In Wells Fargo,

an earlier, unrelated District Court decision had interpreted public housing
notes issued under the Housing Act of 1937 as being exempt from estate tax.
Id. at 353. It had been assumed from the passage of the act that the notes were
only exempt from federal income tax. Id. The plaintiffs had paid the estate tax
on their notes before the District Court decision, and, subsequent to the decision, filed an unsuccessful refund claim. Id. Congress quickly and retroactively
eliminated the newly discovered exemption and any rights to refunds. Id.
Although the United States Supreme Court did not reach the issue of the constitutionality of the retroactive legislation because the Court interpreted the

Housing Act of 1937 as containing no estate tax exemption, it is unlikely that
the Court would have found Congress' action unconstitutional due to the virtual
impossibility of taxpayer reliance on the exemption.
169. See Rule of Prospectivity, supra note 11, at 439.

170. Cf United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292, 299 (1981) (holding that
the taxpayer could not claim surprise when the retroactive tax had been under
public discussion one year before it was passed).
171. See generally Rule of Prospectivity, supra note 11, at 443.
172. See Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
granted, 114 S.Ct. 55 (1993).

173. Cf Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 732
(1984). In Gray, the legislation in question retroactively imposed a pension
fund withdrawal liability. Id. Plaintiffs, even though there was ample notice of
the retroactive liability, withdrew from their pension fund anyway to avoid
other contributions required by the act. Id. The United States Supreme Court
found that the retroactive legislation did not violate due process. Id. at 734.
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actual notice of any proposed retroactive change to the tax code.
Such a result would unduly hamper Congress in its collection of
revenue.
In contrast to a requirement for actual notice, a requirement of
constructive notice of a forthcoming change in the tax code allows
the legislature sufficient administrative flexibility, while not denying the taxpayer his due process. 174 Constructive notice is a legal
fiction whereby the law presumes a person to have knowledge of a
fact if "he could have discovered the fact by proper diligence, and
his situation was such as to cast upon him the duty of inquiring into
it."175 While defining constructive notice is not difficult, determining at what point it is fair to assert that the taxpayer had such
176
notice is difficult.
Nonetheless, courts can consider a number of factors when assessing whether a taxpayer has been given constructive notice of a
retroactively-imposed change in the tax law. Preliminarily, constructive notice might come from two sources. First, the obviousness of an error in the tax code (the "too good to be true"
loophole 177 ) might alone be deemed to put the taxpayer on notice
that a retroactive change may forthcoming. However, the courts
should not require the taxpayer to second-guess Congress, and the
taxpayer should not be punished for relying on clear and unambiguous law.' 78 Consequently, the obviousness of a Congressional blun174. Cf Darusmont, 449 U.S. at 296-97 (holding retroactivity permissible
where "confined to short and limited periods required by the practicalities of
producing national legislation").
175. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1062 (6th ed. 1990).
176. See, e.g., Gray, 467 U.S. at 717 (finding notice based on a similar retroactive liability of related legislation and based on the original Congressional
proposals, which all contained retroactive dates); Darusmont, 449 U.S. at 299
(finding notice where the change had been under "public discussion" for one
year before final passage, citing House and Senate reports as evidence of public
discussion); Carlton,972 F.2d at 1059 (finding no notice of a retroactive change
in the tax law where there were only two vague, fleeting references in the legislative history of the change); Ferman v. United States, 993 F.2d 485, 491 (5th
Cir. 1993) (finding notice of the same legislation in controversy in Carlton
where there was an Internal Revenue Service news release before the plaintiff
had acted in reliance). Carlton exemplifies the problem with defining constructive notice and asserting its fairness in application. In Carlton,the government
did not become aware of one of the references which it asserted gave the taxpayer constructive notice of the change until the night before oral argument.
Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1059.
177. Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1060. The government in Carlton had contended
that the executor's reliance on the ESOP deduction was unreasonable for this
reason. Id. The government implied that the tax statute "was such a windfall,
any reasonable taxpayer would have known it was 'too good to be true.'" Id.
178. Id. at 1060. The Ninth Circuit rejected the government's contention
that the size of the tax deduction should have put Carlton on notice that the
deduction would be retroactively restricted. Id. "We flatly reject the goverr.ment's premise that a taxpayer cannot rely on the clear and unequivocal text of
the tax code, but instead must speculate on the unspoken and inchoate intentions of Congress." Id.
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der should not put the taxpayer on notice of an upcoming
retroactive change in the tax law.
Yet constructive notice of an upcoming change might come
from a second source. A preenactment announcement of a possible
future change in the tax code should, under certain circumstances,
constitute constructive notice to the taxpayer of the change. 179 A
primary consideration when determining if such an announcement
constitutes constructive notice is the source of the announcement.
Announcements of possible changes in the tax code may come from
either non-government sources,18 0 such as the media, or government sources, such as Congress. 1 8 ' Yet media reports cannot give
the taxpayer constructive notice of changes in the tax law, as the
media lacks authority to enact taxes and is often suspect of rumor,
sensationalism, and inaccuracy.
Therefore, announcements of changes in the tax code will constitute constructive notice to the taxpayer only when they come
from government sources, since only these sources have any authority to act on such announcements. However, not every announcement by a government official or agency of a potential change in the
tax law constitutes constructive notice to the taxpayer of a later
change.' 8 2 Again, the courts should consider the source of the an179. Cf Darusmont, 449 U.S. at 299 (finding notice where the change had
been under "public discussion" for one year before final passage, citing House
and Senate reports as evidence of public discussion).

180. Gene Sperling, a National Economic Council aide, claimed that taxpayers were on notice of the retroactive tax hikes contained in the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993 because accounting firms had been warning their
clients since late 1992 that taxes would soon be going up. Richard M. Weintraub, Attack on Retroactive Tax Centralto GOP Opposition,WASH. POST, Aug.
6, 1993, at G1.
181. See, e.g., Darusmont, 449 U.S. at 299 (finding notice where the change

had been under "public discussion" for one year before final passage, citing
House and Senate reports as evidence of public discussion); Ferman v. United
States, 993 F.2d 485, 491 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding notice of a change in the es-

tate tax where there was an Internal Revenue Service news release before the
plaintiff had acted in reliance).
182. Compare Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1059 with Ferman, 993 F.2d at 491. In
Carlton the government cited two references which it contended should have
put the taxpayer on notice of the retroactive change in the tax code. Carlton,

972 F.2d at 1059. One was a statement in a pamphlet published by the Joint
Committee on Taxation written more than a year prior to the passage of the tax
code amendment. Id. The Carlton court found this a weak attempt to establish
constructive notice since the reference did not "purport to speak for Congress or
even a congressional committee . . . ." Id. The second reference was a passing
remark by a senator on the floor of the Senate. Id. The Carlton court also
easily rejected this reference as constituting constructive notice. Id. In

Ferman, the Fifth Circuit heard a case virtually analogous to Carlton, where

the plaintiff had relied on the same estate tax deduction upon which Carlton

had relied. Ferman, 993 F.2d at 491. However, in Ferman, the plaintiff had
taken action in reliance on the Congressional mistake after the IRS had pub-

lished a news release announcing the changes, whereas Carlton had acted
before the release. Id.
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nouncement. The power of the proclaimant to effectuate the potential change lends credibility to an assertion of constructive
notice.18 3 Other factors that should indicate constructive notice, or
lack thereof, are the specificity and definitiveness of the announcement, as well as the public exposure to the announcement. 184 The
greater the similarity between the prediction of changes and the

final enactment, the more likely it is that the prior announcement
put the taxpayer on notice of a potential change in the tax law.185
Further, constructive notice would be more evident if similarly situated taxpayers took action in response to the announcement.18 6
In addition to the source, courts must consider the timing of an
announcement when determining whether a taxpayer has been
given constructive notice of a future change. 8 7 When the retroactive tax is part of a budget act, the President will usually give8 a8
speech to Congress outlining the budget he intends to submit.'

The House Ways and Means Committee, after tinkering with the
budget bill, will announce a "tentative decision" and may then issue
its Committee Report.' 8 9 The bill then moves to the Senate Finance Committee, which usually will also issue a Committee ReThe Conference Committee will then work out a
port. 190
183. Cf Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1059.
184. See generally Rule of Prospectivity, supra note 11, at 443-44. All three
would be positively correlated with a finding that constructive notice was given.
The more specific the announcement, the more definitive the source, and the
more exposure to the public, the more likely it is that it is fair to impute to the
taxpayer as a matter of law knowledge of the impending change. Cf Ferman,
993 F.2d at 491. The Ferman court held that "although [the IRS release] did
not carry the authority of binding law, it did notify taxpayers of the possibility
that section 2057 [the erroneous section] would be amended, how section 2057
might be amended, and the fact that there was risk associated with entering
into transactions solely out of reliance upon section 2057." Id. The court further held that to deny that the IRS release did not constitute constructive notice would allow the taxpayer "to locate Congress' mistakes and exploit them
before they are corrected." Id.
185. Cf Carlton,972 F.2d at 1059 (holding that two ambiguous references in
the legislative history did not constitute constructive notice of a later retroactive change in the legislation).
186. Cf Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 732
(1984) (finding notice of a retroactive tax where many employers had, like the
plaintiff, withdrawn from pension plans in an attempt to avoid the legislation).
187. Cf United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292, 299 (1981) (finding notice
where the change "had been under public discussion for almost a year before its
enactment"); Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1059 (finding no notice where the relevant
reference was made more than a year before passage of the retroactive enactment); Ferman v. United States, 993 F.2d 485, 492 (5th Cir. 1993). The Ferman
court suggested that the time between a Congressional error and an attempt to
notify taxpayers of the error might relate to a finding of constructive notice: the
less time between the error and the acknowledgment, the more likely it is that
the acknowledgment constituted constructive notice. Id.
188. THE COMMITTEE ON TAX POLICY, NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,
RETROACTIviTY OF TAX LEGISLATION, 29 TAX LAW. 21, 25 (1975).
189. Id.
190. Id.
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compromise between the two bills and issue a final recommendation which the President may then sign into law. 1 1 Press releases
and media reports will be interspersed in between all these occurrences. The point at which courts may infer constructive notice will
vary with the circumstances surrounding enactment.
What is clear, however, is that if fairness and certainty are the
goals in setting tax effective dates, the date of enactment should be
the earliest date upon which the courts can fairly assert that a taxpayer has notice of a change in the tax law. 192 The taxpayer has a
right to demand certainty as to his tax burden, and the courts
should not ask him to plan his affairs by guessing what actions
Congress will take. 19 3 If constructive notice is possible during the
enactment process, the taxpayer is essentially in a state of paralysis: 19 4 he cannot rely on the existing tax law because it may be

changing, yet he cannot rely on any proposed changes because their
passage is uncertain. 195 Moreover, allowing notice to occur before
enactment actually punishes those who rely in good faith on existing law, since constructive notice brings their actions within the
scope of new legislation.' 96 Thus, making tax statutes effective
would provide the maximum protecfrom their dates of enactment
97
tion of taxpayer reliance.'
At the other extreme, the test for "notice" that the Supreme
Court has historically applied affords the taxpayer virtually no protection when he relies on an existing tax law. In addition to allowing the "customary Congressional practice" of calendar-year
retroactivity regardless of notice, 198 the United States Supreme
Court has justified retroactive rate increases on the basis that such
191. Id.
192. For strong arguments in favor of making all tax legislation prospective

in effect, see generally Rule of Prospectivity, supra note 11, at 436.
193. Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440, 445-46 (1928).
The taxpayer may justly demand to know when and how he becomes liable
for taxes - he cannot foresee and ought not to be required to guess the
outcome of pending measures. The future of every bill while before Congress is necessarily uncertain. The will of the lawmakers is not definitely
expressed until final action thereon has been taken.
Id.
194. See THE COMMITrEE ON TAX POLICY, NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,
RETROACTIVITY OF TAX LEGISLATION, supra note 188, at 22.
195. Rule of Prospectivity, supra note 11, at 443. The Note questions the
logic of requiring a taxpayer to rely on something which is not constitutionally
"law." Id. Constructive notice also gives members of Congress great power to
alter conduct, if by introducing legislation or even making foreshadowing comments, they have the power to alter taxpayer behavior. Id.
196. Id. Taxpayers who rely in good faith on existing law, either because
they are ignorant of the proposed change or must act out of necessity, are punished to avoid evasion of the impending statute by more knowledgeable taxpayers. Id.
197. Id. at 454-55.
198. As further evidence of the hollowness of the due process standard in
retroactive tax cases, the Court has held that calendar-year retroactivity (retro-
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taxes are not "wholly new taxes." 19 9 The simple fact that a transaction has been taxed in the past is purported to give the taxpayer
constructive notice of any future retroactive tax rate increase. 20 0
This test for notice is a floodgate. The original taxable event opens
the door for any infinite number of future retroactive tax rate increases. 20 1 As the size of the government over the last 100 years
has grown immensely and the number of non-taxable events in a
taxpayer's life has decreased drastically, 20 2 such a test renders due
process meaningless. Thus, the courts should abandon the "wholly
new tax" test as a test for notice, and the courts should not allow
the time-honored customs of Congress 20 3 to dispense with the notice requirement entirely. 2 04 Although constructive notice may not
provide the maximum protection of the taxpayer's due process
rights and may, in some situations be difficult to determine, constructive notice, as determined by the source and timing of preenactment announcements, strikes a good balance between the
taxpayer's interests and the interests of Congress.
c.

Could the Taxpayer Have Altered His Behavior if He Had
Been Given Notice of the Tax?
Even when the government fails to provide notice to the tax-

activity to January 1) is "customary congressional practice" and justified regardless of notice. United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292, 296-97 (1981).
Usually the "retroactive" feature [of general revenue statutes] has application only to that portion of the current calendar year preceding the date of
enactment .... This "retroactive" application apparently has been confined
to short and limited periods required by the practicalities of producing national legislation. We may safely say that it is a customary congressional
practice.
Id.
199. United States v. Hemme, 476 U.S. 558, 568 (1986); Darusmont, 449
U.S. at 298.
[One who has been subjected to a retroactive tax rate increase] may indeed
complain that, could he have foreseen the increase, he would have kept the
transaction unliquidated, but it will not avail him; he must be prepared for
such possibilities, the system being already in operation. His is a different
case from that of one who, when he takes action, has no reason to suppose
that any transactions of the sort will be taxed at all.
Id. (quoting Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 1930)).
200. See Darusmont,449 U.S. at 298.
201. Certainly no taxpayer realized at the time he was studying about the
Boston Tea Party that he was simultaneously being given constructive notice
that the tax on his tea may one day be retroactively increased.
202. For example, gifts were at one time untaxed. For a discussion of cases
involving the first gift tax, see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
203. Darusmont, 449 U.S. at 296-97.
204. Notice, however, should define the extent of permissible retroactivity.
Constructive notice will not allow unbounded retroactivity; statutes may only
be retroactive to the day on which notice was given. Cf Carlton v. United
States, 972 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding retroactive loophole-closing legislation unconstitutional where no notice of the change was possible prior to the
taxpayer's completed transaction), cert. granted, 114 S.Ct. 55 (1993).
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payer of a retroactive tax, the tax may still survive a due process
challenge. 20 5 Where the taxpayer could not have altered his conduct even had he known of the retroactive tax, the Supreme Court
has held that due process is not offended. 20 6 Therefore, a retroactive gift tax is more likely to violate due process than a retroactive
property tax. 20 7 A taxpayer may not have made a gift had he
known of the tax, while it is much more unlikely that he would not
dispose of property for the same reason. 20 8 Thus, the courts allow
more retroactive effect for income taxes than they do for estate or
gift taxes, since courts assume that a taxpayer would continue to
20 9
receive income regardless of the tax rate.
Yet this argument is fundamentally flawed. Due process analysis should rarely depend on the type of tax involved. The argument that a taxpayer would continue to receive income even if he
knew it were to be taxed at a higher rate may be true. 2 10 However,
the implied assumption that a taxpayer is limited to either accepting or rejecting income is untenable and unrealistic in today's
society where ingenious tax attorneys abound. An individual may
choose to defer or expedite his income 2 11 just as easily as he might
choose not to make a gift or not to plan his estate in a certain way.
By assuming that the taxpayer would not have altered his behavior
even had he been given knowledge of the tax,2 12 the Court is making a financial decision for the taxpayer which it has no right to
make.
Moreover, even if the taxpayer's ability to alter his behavior is
important, courts should not factor it in to the due process equation
as courts have in the past. Historically, a retroactive tax is more
likely to be upheld against due process attack where the taxpayer
could not have altered his conduct to avoid the tax. 2 13 The result
should be just the opposite. In the rare situation where the tax205. See Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938) (upholding against constitu-

tional attack a retroactive tax on corporate dividends despite a lack of notice).
206. Id. at 147-48. The Supreme Court in Welch used this argument to distinguish the income tax in question from prior gift tax cases. Id.
207. Id.
208. Cf id.
209. Id.
210. Welch, 305 U.S. at 147-48. This argument was made in Welch and
seems to be one of the reasons why the United States Supreme Court allows
more retroactivity in the area of income taxes as opposed to estate and gift
taxes. In Welch the Court stated, "We can not assume that stockholders would
refuse to receive corporate dividends even if they knew that their receipt would
later be subjected to a new tax or to the increase of an old one." Id. at 148. For
a discussion of other reasons why the Court distinguishes income taxes from
estate and gift taxes when dealing with retroactivity, see supra note 14.
211. Hochman, supra note 14, at 707 (noting that the taxpayer may choose to
defer income to another year or may change the character of his income so that
he might avoid a higher income tax rate).
212. See Welch, 305 U.S. at 148.
213. Compare Welch, 305 U.S. at 134 (finding constitutional a retroactive tax
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payer would be unable to take any action to avoid a tax, a retroactive tax would seem to be most repugnant to due process. 2 14 Thus,
a tax statute should be more suspect of due process violations
where it affects taxpayers who are unable to avoid its retroactive
operation.
2.

The Legislature's Concerns - Is There a Legitimate
Legislative Purpose Furthered by a Rational Means?

While the preceding factors help insure that the taxpayer is not
denied due process, courts must balance these due process considerations against Congress' needs in carrying out the policies of government. 2 15 The fact that a taxable event occurs before the date of
a statute's enactment is not per se a violation of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 2 16 While the simple need for
revenue should rarely alone justify retroactivity in revenue enactments, 2 17 other Congressional justifications may sometimes outweigh what would otherwise be violations of the taxpayer's due
process.
The most compelling reason for allowing tax statutes some retroactive effect is to prevent evasion by the taxpayer during the enactment process. Congressional revenue statutes may be selfdefeating if, during the process of enactment, the system allows
enough taxpayers to take action to avoid the tax. 2 18 However, this
on corporate dividends) with Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440 (1928) (finding unconstitutional the retroactive application of the first gift tax).
214. The taxpayer's ability to alter his behavior is often equated with the
degree to which the right being impaired has "vested." See generally Greenblatt, supra note 35, at 561-66. Thus, retroactive gift taxes are more suspect of
due process violations than income taxes because a gift may be completely
vested before the retroactive tax is passed. Welch, 305 U.S. at 147-48.
215. Cf Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984)
(justifying retroactivity where there is a "legitimate legislative purpose furthered by a rational means"); see generally Rule of Prospectivity,supra note 11,

at 438-42; Hochman, supra note 14, at 697 (suggesting three factors which must
be weighed in assessing the constitutionality of retroactive taxes: "the nature
and strength of the public interest served by the statute, the extent to which the
statute modifies or abrogates the asserted preenactment right, and the nature
of the right which the statute alters").
216. See, e.g., United States v. Hemme, 476 U.S. 558, 568 (1986); Welch v.
Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147 (1938). The Supreme Court in Hemme stated that
"some retrospective effect is not necessarily fatal to a revenue law." Hemme,
476 U.S. at 568.
217. Retroactivity of tax statutes should never be justified solely on these
grounds since there are a virtually infinite number of other revenue-generating
means available to Congress which do not implicate due process concerns. For
example, to generate a certain amount of revenue, Congress may, instead of
taxing at a lower rate and applying such a tax retroactively to the first of a year,
raise the rate slightly and apply the tax prospectively. By applying the tax
prospectively, Congress could not be charged with violating the taxpayer's due
process, since the taxpayer retains the freedom to plan his financial affairs
based on the new tax rates.
218. See generally Gray, 467 U.S. at 717 (upholding retroactive legislation
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justification is not as compelling as it might sound. First, allowing
under-the-wire activity encourages taxpayers to stay well-informed
of the law. 2 19 Secondly, Congress can limit the loss of revenue during the enactment process by giving the taxpayer constructive notice of the impending change. 2 20 Thirdly, the number of taxpayers
that daily browse the Congressional Record to keep abreast of Congressional activity is surely outweighed by the number who do not.
It is certainly within Congress' power to anticipate the extent of
taxpayer evasion and adjust other revenue-raising provisions accordingly.2 2 1 Consequently, this exception allowing retroactivity of
revenue statutes should be a very limited one, justified only when
taxpayer evasion during the enactment process severely threatens
2 22
the purpose of the legislation.
Retroactive "curative" tax statutes are less justifiable than
statutes retroactively applied to prevent taxpayer evasion. First,
those individuals who rely to their detriment on existing law should
not bear the cost of a Congressional mistake that Congress could
spread among all taxpayers. 223 Secondly, by not forcing the taxpayer to bear the financial burden of Congressional mistakes, the
courts would discourage sloppy Congressional drafting of legislation. 2 2 4 However, courts should find retroactive curative statutes
permissible under certain circumstances. As discussed previously,
retroactive curative statutes may range from those which merely
correct inadvertent technical errors to those which close unintended
loopholes. 2 25 The more minor the error, the more leeway Congress
where many employers had withdrawn from their pension plans to avoid the
new enactment); United States v. Hudson, 299 U.S. 498 (1937).
219. Cf Rule of Prospectivity, supra note 11, at 443.
220. For further discussion of constructive notice, see supra notes 174-204
and accompanying text.
221. Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) has suggested that the revenue lost
by eliminating the retroactive provisions of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1993 could be regained from a three-percent across-the-board cut in
spending. Kircheimer, supra note 1, at 911-12.
222. See Rule of Prospectivity, supra note 11, at 445-46. There are some
situations where a statute may be totally futile unless applied retroactively.
The Interest Equalization Tax of 1954 was made retroactive to the date on
which the President proposed it to Congress. Id. at 445. The tax was imposed
to keep capital in the country by taxing the interest paid on foreign investments. Id. During the enactment process, however, a huge outflow of capital
occurred which threatened the very purpose of the legislation. Id. Retroactivity should be permitted in such rare situations. Id.
223. THE COMMITTEE ON TAX POLICY, NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,
RETROACTIVITY OF TAX LEGISLATION, supra note 188, at 23 (1975). But see
Ferman v. United States, 993 F.2d 485, 492 (5th Cir. 1993) (upholding a retroactive curative statute despite detrimental reliance by the taxpayer where
there was constructive notice of the change).
224. Id.
225. For a discussion of the different types of curative statutes and examples
of each, see supra notes 84-101 and accompanying text.
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should have in retroactively fixing the mistake. 22 6 Yet even where
the error is minor, the Due Process Clause may prohibit Congress
from retroactively correcting the error if taxpayers, without notice
22 7
of the mistake, reasonably relied on the error to their detriment.
For the same reason, courts should allow retroactive loophole-closing provisions in even a more limited number of situations, as the
risk of taxpayer reliance is much greater. 228 Hence, courts should
permit retroactive curative statutes only where the retroactivity is
necessary to correct minor technical errors and where the
probability of taxpayer reliance is minimal.
III.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE RETROACTIVE ESTATE, GIFT,
AND INCOME TAX PROVISIONS OF THE OMNIBUS BUDGET

RECONCILIATION ACT OF

1993.

President Bill Clinton signed the Omnibus Reconciliation Act
(the "Budget Act") of 1993 into law on August 10, 1993.229 The
2 30
Budget Act contains several controversial retroactive provisions.
Under the Budget Act, some taxpayers (married individuals with
over $140,000 in combined income and single individuals making
over $115,000) will find that they have unknowingly been in a new
thirty-six percent tax bracket since January 1, 1993.231 Even
wealthier individuals will be further surprised to discover that Congress has been assessing a ten percent surtax on this top rate since
January 1, 1993.232 The Budget Act allows taxpayers to pay the
extra tax in three annual installments. 2 33 The Budget Act gratuitously does not charge penalties and interest on the extra tax now
due. 23 4 The retroactivity is not limited to individual income tax
rates. The Budget Act has also increased the top corporate tax rate
226. Compare Hochman, supra note 14, at 705-06 (noting the United States
Supreme Court's reluctance to strike down statutes which "cure inadvertent
defects") with Rule of Prospectivity,supra note 11, at 440 (suggesting that taxpayer reliance may prevent the government from freely retroactively closing

loopholes).

227. Cf Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
granted, 114 S. Ct. 55 (1993). Although Carlton involved the retroactive closing

of a larger-than-expected loophole, the Carlton court did not distinguish between different degrees of governmental error.
228. See id.
229. Kircheimer, supra note 1, at 911.
230. For further discussion of the controversy surrounding the Budget Act,
see supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
231. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 § 13201, 26 U.S.C. § 1
(1993). For more information on the specific changes in the tax code, see supra
notes 229-38 and accompanying text.
232. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 § 13201. This provision will
result in some taxpayers (those making more than $250,000 per year) seeing

their income tax rate go up from 31% under the old law to 39.6% under the new
law. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
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from thirty-four to thirty-five percent, retroactive to January 1,
1993.235

In addition, the retroactive effect is not limited to income taxes.

2 36
The Budget Act also retroactively increases estate and gift taxes.
The Budget Act raises the tax rate to fifty-three percent on transfers valued between $2.5 million and $3 million and raises the rate
to fifty-five percent on transfers above $3 million. 2 37 These rate
increases, like the increases in income tax rates, are effective as of
January 1, 1993,238 over seven months before the Budget Act was
passed.
These retroactive provisions in the Budget Act are unconstitutional, since no legitimate legislative need for the retroactivity exists which would outweigh the violation of the taxpayer's due
process. Detrimental reliance by the taxpayer on the existing rates
is likely, especially on the prior gift and estate tax rates. In addition, such reliance was reasonable given the impossibility of notice
of a tax which reaches back to a prior administration for revenue.
Further, it is probable that taxpayers would have planned their
financial affairs differently, given notice of the rate increases.
Lastly, President Clinton and Congress applied the provisions of
the Budget Act retroactively for the sole purpose of raising revenue, 2 39 which is not a legitimate legislative purpose justifying the
due process violations.

A.
1.

Is the Taxpayer's Due Process Violated?

Is It Likely That the Taxpayer Relied to His Detriment on the
PriorLaw?

These retroactive provisions of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 obviously pass the detriment threshold required to
235. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 § 13221, 26 U.S.C. § 11
(1993).
236. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 § 13208, 26 U.S.C. § 2001

(1993). The Clinton administration has attempted to downplay the retroactive
gift and estate tax rate increases by claiming that there is no new increase in
the gift and estate tax rates. White House, White House Release JustifiesRetroactive Increases in OBRA 1993, TAX NoTEs TODAY, Aug. 20, 1993, at 15. However, the administration is simply playing word games. Although the new rates
are technically not "new," they are retroactively-increased tax rates. The Act
resurrects the top two estate and gift tax rates, which had been eliminated as of
December 31, 1992. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 § 13208. The
top estate and gift tax rate had been 50% since January 1, 1993. Cloud, supra
note 3, at 2133.
237. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 § 13208.
238. Id.
239. The goal of the Budget Act was to reduce the deficit, through increased
taxes and spending cuts, by $500 billion. Weintraub, supra note 180, at G1.
Political pressures over the corporate income tax hike and the gasoline tax "left
the personal income tax rate as the main source for last-minute additional tax
revenue." Id.
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find a due process violation. 2 40 In the seven month period preceding passage of the Budget Act, individuals who had thought that
their income was being taxed at the then-current rate of 31% will
instead find their income was being taxed at a rate of 36%, and in
some cases, 39.6%.241 The estimated 1,000 individuals in the upper
estate brackets 2 42 who died between January 1 and August 9, 1993,
will not have left their children as much support as they had
thought when they originally planned their estates. Further, these
retroactive provisions of the Budget Act do not confer any offsetting
benefits upon the affected taxpayers, 2 43 so as to preliminarily avoid
a due process attack for lack of a deprivation. Thus, these provisions have the necessary "harsh and oppressive" 244 effect on the
targeted taxpayers.
Reliance by the affected taxpayers on the prior tax law is also
likely, especially on the old estate and gift tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. Admittedly, in relying on prior estate and
gift tax rates, the now-deceased taxpayers were not responding to a
tax incentive in furtherance of a social policy. 24 5 Nor, however,
were they taking advantage of a large loophole to avoid a tax burden which would have otherwise been due. 24 6 Knowledge of current estate and gift tax rates is an essential part of estate tax
planning. 247 Thus, a presumption of reliance on the prior estate
and gift tax provisions is fair.
Similarly, a presumption of reliance on the prior income tax
rates is also reasonable. Taxpayers in the highest income tax
bracket may have been content with the thirty-one percent income
tax rate which they thought was being assessed. Yet a court may
not assume that these taxpayers would have taken no action to
minimize their income tax had they known that the rate was instead 39.6%.248 Since it is not plainly obvious that upper-income
240. For further discussion of the detriment threshold required to find a due
process violation, see supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
241. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 § 13201, 26 U.S.C. § 1
(1993).

242. The Phony Retroactive Scare, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 16, 1993, at A16.
243. The Budget Act does retroactively confer some benefits, such as a research and development tax credit, a low-income housing tax credit, employerprovided education assistance, a Targeted Jobs tax credit, and a 25-percent selfemployed health deduction. White House, supra note 236, at 15. Yet these
benefits do not directly affect the taxpayers hit with the retroactive tax rate
increases.
244. See Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147 (1938).
245. See Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
granted, 114 S.Ct. 55 (1993).
246. See generally Rule of Prospectivity, supra note 11, at 440 (discussing
why taxpayer reliance has sometimes been looked upon disfavorably where a

loophole is utilized to avoid paying certain taxes).
247. See Carlton, 972 F.2d at 1051.
248. For further discussion of the artificial distinction between income taxes
and estate/gift taxes, see supra notes 163-69 and accompanying text.
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taxpayers did not rely on the older income tax rates, a court should
also presume taxpayer reliance on these rates.
2. Was There Notice of the Tax Rate Increases So That the
Detrimental Reliance Was Unreasonable?
Not only was reliance on the prior tax rates probable, such reliance was also reasonable given the lack of notice of the retroactive
rate increases. Even assuming that constructive notice of a retroactive change will defeat a taxpayer's claim of a due process violation, 24 9 constructive notice of the provisions in the 1993 Budget Act
retroactive to January 1, 1993, could not possibly have occurred if
constructive notice is to be a meaningful concept. The questionable
provisions of the Act reach back before Clinton was even inaugurated and apply to the last three weeks of the George Bush presidency. 250 The earliest conceivable date upon which the government
might have put the taxpayer on notice would be February 17, 1993,
the date on which Clinton first announced his deficit-reduction
plan. 25 1 Yet even this date is questionable as a fair date upon

which a court may assert that the taxpayer had constructive notice,
since the Clinton administration did not announce the specific retroactive provisions until April 8, 1993.252
However, even April 8, 1993, is not realistically a fair date for
the law to impute to the taxpayer knowledge of the retroactive provisions of the Budget Act. The fate of the Budget Act was highly
uncertain throughout the enactment process, as the budget bill
2 53
passed by the narrowest of margins in both houses of Congress.
The House of Representatives passed the budget bill by a vote of
218-216 on August 5, 1993,254 and the bill squeaked through the
Senate by a vote of 51-50 on August 6, 1993.255 The government
may fairly assert that it gave taxpayers constructive notice of the
retroactive tax changes on August 6, 1993, although this date of
constructive notice would only justify retroactivity to August 6, not
to January 1. Thus, where a bill containing retroactive tax provisions is so controversial that its passage in Congress is highly un249. Cf United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292, 299 (1981). The Court in
Darusmont assumed that

notice was relevant for the sake of argument and

then went on to find constructive notice. Id.
250. The retroactive income, estate, and gift tax provisions are effective January -1, 1993. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 §§ 13201, 13208,
13221, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1, 11, 2001 (1993).
251. White House, supra note 236, at 15.
252. Stephen C. Glazier, Tax Bill: Retroactive, Unconstitutional .... WALL
ST. J., Aug. 5, 1993, at A12.
253. George Hager & David S. Cloud, Democrats Tie Their Fate to Clinton's
Budget Bill, Cong. Q., Aug. 7, 1993, at 2122.
254. Id.
255. It took the vote of Vice-President Al Gore to break the deadlock in the
Senate. Id.
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certain, the government cannot reasonably assert that it has given
the taxpayer constructive notice until the act has cleared Congress.
Suprisingly, proponents of the Budget Act have claimed that
notice of the January 1 retroactivity did occur, even before Clinton
put his hand to the Bible in the oath-taking ceremony. The Congressional Research Service (CRS), after Congress asked the CRS
whether the retroactive provisions of the Budget Act violate the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, reasoned that taxpayers were on notice of the change in estate tax rates because Congress had raised the rates in 1984 and 1987.256 Further notice,
according to the CRS, comes from the fact that Congress proposed
the same rate increases in 1992, although President Bush vetoed
them. 25 7 Regarding notice of the income tax hike, the CRS, citing
United States v. Darusmont, seemingly adopted the Supreme
Court's view that notice is not required for calendar-year retroactive income tax rate increases, since these increases are "customary
258
Congressional practice."
Other sources, besides the CRS, have claimed that the taxpayer was given notice of the tax increases. The White House itself
claims that taxpayers were on notice of the retroactive rate increases because Clinton promised to increase taxes on the rich during his campaign. 259 Others assert that taxpayers had constructive
notice of the retroactive taxes because tax practitioners and accounting firms had been warning their clients of higher taxes since

late 1992.260
However, pre-inauguration events cannot put the public on notice of later retroactive taxes. Past Congressional increases in tax
rates, presidential campaign promises, and accounting firm newsletters do not put the taxpayer on notice of a retroactive estate tax
rate increase. First, past estate tax rate increases give no notice of
future rate increases, and the fact that retroactive income tax rate
increases are "customary Congressional practice" cannot dispense
with the due process requirement of notice altogether. 2 6 1 Secondly,
Bill Clinton as a presidential candidate or even as an incoming
president had little power at the time to effectuate any taxes he was
proposing. 26 2 Although the media gave them wide exposure, Clin256. Marie B. Morris, CRS Memorandum FindingRetroactive Tax Increases
in OBRA 1993 Constitutional,TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. 20, 1993, at 13.
257. Id.
258. Id. (citing United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292, 297 (1981)).
259. White House, supra note 236, at 15. The President was always "clear
and direct" on his intent to tax the rich. Id.
260. Weintraub, supra note 180, at G1.
261. For further discussion of why tax rate increases do not become foreseeable once a tax is first applied, see supra notes 198-204 and accompanying text.
262. For further discussion of how this power is related to the concept of
constructive notice, see supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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ton's campaign promises were neither specific, definitive, nor simi-

26 3
lar to the subsequent retroactive taxes in the Budget Act.

Clinton only promised to tax the rich, not to tax the rich retroactively.26 4 President Clinton did not even mention retroactivity until April 8, 1993,265 and the effective dates of the retroactive
2 66
provisions changed many times during the enactment process.
Thirdly, reports from tax consultants and accountants were specu2 67
lative, unauthoritative, and predicative of higher taxes only.

More specifically, George Bush's veto of a similar estate tax
provision before he left office does not put taxpayers on notice that
the next President may try to retroactively apply the same tax. In
fact, the prior veto makes the estate tax even more repugnant to the
Constitution and points to the most alarming aspect of the Budget
Act, if the courts uphold it against constitutional attack. The
Budget Act exemplifies taxation without representation 268 and, in
effect, allows Clinton to legislate history. 2 69 For the first twenty
days of 1993, the 43-percent president Bill Clinton 270 and the 124
new members of the 103rd Congress 27 1 are imposing taxes that
President George Bush and the prior 103rd Congress did not wish
to impose. 2 72 Never before has a President signed a revenue act
which reached back to a prior administration to collect taxes. 273 In
263. For further discussion of these factors as tending to show that the government has given constructive notice, see supra notes 182-191 and accompanying text.
264. White House, supra note 236, at 15 (1993).
The President said in the most clear manner possible throughout the entire
campaign, the transition and in his original proposal on February 17, 1993
(which had a January 1, 1993 effective date) that he would push for a modest tax increase on the top 1% of Americans, those making over $180,000.
Id.
265. Glazier, supra note 252, at A12.
266. The House of Representative's proposal had the same effective date as
that of the President's, January 1, 1993. Weintraub, supra note 180, at G1.
The Senate's proposal had an effective date of July 1, 1993. Id. During the
Conference Committee debate the date was pushed back to March 1, 1993 to
raise additional revenue. Id. The Clinton administration later suggested the
date be pushed back to February 17, 1993. Id.
267. Weintraub, supra note 180, at G1.
268. One of the reasons for the Declaration of Independence was Great Britain's "imposing taxes on us without our consent." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 18 (U.S. 1776).
269. Glazier, supra note 252, at A12. "Retroactive laws also would allow a
new party taking power after an election to, in effect, legislate history - to undo
the past of its opponents." Id. "If notice requirements are no longer to be observed, the 1913 income tax can be made retroactive to the founding of the
country and all personal wealth can be confiscated." Paul C. Roberts, Overtaxing the Rich and the Dead, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1993, at M5.
270. Bill Clinton won the presidential election in 1992 with only 43% of the
popular vote. See, e.g., Repeal Retroactivity!, supra note 5, at A12.
271. NYNEX GOV'T AFFAIRS Co., THE U.S. CONGRESS HANDBOOK 5 (1993).
272. Morris, supra note 256, at 13.
273. The Treasury Department has published the following summary of retroactive tax rate increases and their effective dates:
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1917: The Revenue Act of 1917 imposed a surtax on individuals and an
excess profits tax on corporations. The Act was passed on October 3, 1917
and the rate changes applied retroactively to the 1917 calendar year.
1918: The Revenue Act of 1918 increased individual rates and corporate
rates. The Act was passed February 24, 1919, and the rate increases applied retroactively to the 1918 calendar year.
1935: The Revenue Act of 1935 increased the individual surtax rate and the
corporate rate. The Act passed on August 30, 1935. The effective date for
this tax was generally prospective, based on a pro ration formula, but for
some corporations, it was possible that the rate could have been retroactive
from July 30, 1935 to June 30, 1935.
1936: The Revenue Act of 1936 imposed an undistributed profits tax on
corporations. The Act was passed on June 22, 1936 and the tax applied
retroactively to December 31, 1935.
1938: The Revenue Act of 1938 altered the distribution of the corporate tax
to make the tax more progressive. High income corporations faced a higher
tax. The Act was passed May 28, 1938 and applied retroactively to years
beginning after December 31, 1937.
1940: The Revenue Act of 1940 raised corporate rates and imposed a Defense Tax on individuals. The Act was passed June 25, 1940 and was effective retroactively to December 31, 1939. The Second Revenue Act of 1940
added an additional surtax on corporations and an excess profits tax on
corporations. The Act was passed October 10, 1940. Both increases were
effective retroactively back to December 31, 1939.
1941: The Revenue Act of 1941 increased the surtax on individuals and
corporations, effective retroactively to December 31, 1940. The Act was
passed on September 9, 1941.
1942: The Revenue Act of 1942 increased the normal tax and the surtax on
individuals, both retroactive to December 31, 1941. The Act also increased
the corporate surtax, again retrospective to December 31, 1941.
1943: The Revenue Act of 1943 increased the excess profits tax on corporations. The Act was not passed until February 25, 1944 and the rate
changes applied retroactively to December 31, 1943.
1950: The Excess Profits Tax Act of 1950 imposed an excess profits tax to
taxable years ending after June 30, 1950. The Act was approved January 3,
1951.
1951: The Revenue Act of 1951 increased corporate rates both retroactively
and prospectively. The rates were increased as of January 1, 1951, with
further increases to take effect January 1, 1952. The Act was passed October 21, 1951.
1968: The Revenue and Expenditure Control Act of 1968 imposed a surtax
on all taxpayers. For individuals, estates and trusts, the surtax was retroactive to April 1, 1968. For corporations, the surtax was retroactive to January 1,1968. The Act was passed on October 22, 1968.
1976: Tax Reform Act of 1976 increased the alternative minimum tax on
individuals from 10 percent to 15 percent. The corporate alternative minimum tax was similarly increased to 15 percent. Both increases were effective after December 31, 1975. The Act was passed on October 4, 1976.
U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Treasury Release Listing Retroactive Tax Rate Changes
from 1917 to 1976, TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. 20, 1993, at 16.
Thus, the Revenue Act of 1917 and the Revenue Act of 1918 only retroactively taxed during the Woodrow Wilson administration (1913-21). The Revenue Acts of 1935-36, 1938, and 1940-43 all retroactively levied taxes only
during the Franklin Delano Roosevelt administration (1933-45). The Excess
Profits Tax Act of 1950 and the Revenue Act of 1951 each only applied retroactively during the Harry Truman administration (1945-53). The retroactive provisions of the 1968 act only applied to the years Lyndon Johnson was in office
(1963-1969). Finally, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 applied retroactively during
the Gerald Ford administration (1974-1977).
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those years when a change in presidency takes place, the date of
inauguration should be an absolute limitation on the extent of retroactivity of any tax measures of the incoming President and
Congress.
3. Could the Taxpayer Have Taken Action to Minimize His Tax
Burden Had He Known of the Increased Rates?
While no notice would have been possible to justify the Budget
Act's retroactivity, the Clinton administration may contend that, at
least with respect to the income tax hike, the taxpayer would not
have acted differently even had he known of the tax. 2 74 However,
since the distinction between income and estate and gift taxes is an
artificial one, 27 5 this argument has no merit, given the sharp rate
increases 276 and the nature of estate tax planning. 2 77 In summary,
since reasonable detrimental reliance on the prior tax law is likely,
Congress must show a legitimate legislative purpose for the retroactivity of the Budget Act to outweigh the apparent due process
2 78
violations.
B.

Is There a Legitimate Legislative Need for the Retroactivity of
the Budget Act Which Will Justify the Infringement of
the Taxpayer's Due Process?

No legitimate legislative purpose of the Budget Act exists
which would excuse the due process violations of the Act. The Clinton administration and Congress made the income, estate, and gift
tax rate increases retroactive to January 1, 1993, for the sole purpose of generating revenue. 27 9 The need for revenue alone should
rarely justify retroactive taxation. While the government may contend that there is a legitimate legislative need to reduce the deficit, 28 0 the retroactive provisions of the Budget Act are not a
"rational means" to achieve this result when spending cuts and pro28 1
spective taxes are also available.
None of the traditional justifications for retroactivity are appli274. See generally Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 148 (1938).
275. For further discussion of why the courts should not distinguish between
different types of taxes when analyzing tax statutes for due process violations,
see supra notes 163-169 and accompanying text.
276. Where the income tax rate jumped from 31% to 39.6% for some taxpayers, it is highly probable that, given notice of the change, such taxpayers would
have acted to minimize the financial effects of such a harsh change.
277. Cf Carlton v. United States, 972 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
granted, 114 S. Ct. 55 (1993).
278. Cf Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729
(1984).
279. Weintraub, supra note 180, at G1.
280. Cf id.
281. By eliminating the retroactivity from the Budget Act, the Clinton administration would have lost only $9 billion in revenue over the next five years,
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cable to the retroactive provisions of the Budget Act. Congress did
not apply the rate increases retroactively to prevent taxpayer evasion during the enactment process. 28 2 Nor are the retroactive provisions "curative" in nature. The retroactive provisions of the
Budget Act are tax rate increases, not mistake-correcting or loophole-closing provisions. Instead, the retroactive rate increases on
the wealthy appear to be an attempt by the Clinton administration
28 3
to legislate history by repealing the so-called "decade of greed,"
an impermissible, unconstitutional, and undemocratic purpose.
The Clinton administration has defended the Budget Act's retroactive taxes on the grounds that the Act also retroactively proWhile an exception exists allowing
vides tax credits. 28 4
28 5
retroactivity where benefits are conferred or tax relief is granted,
the Clinton administration is misapplying the exception. Retroactive tax relief is always permissible, and Congress may even justify
a retroactive tax where simultaneous retroactive tax relief results
in a net benefit to the taxpayer. 28 6 However, the mere fact that a
revenue act contains retroactive tax credits, in addition to retroactive taxes, will not automatically excuse the act of due process violations. The retroactive tax satisfies due process only where the tax
is closely intertwined with a corresponding benefit that results in a
net gain to the taxpayer. 28 7 The Budget Act does not satisfy this
requirement. 28 8 It is unlikely that an individual with annual earnings of $250,000 who has seen his income tax rate rocket up from
thirty-one to 39.6% retroactively will content himself with the Act
knowing that the same act has retroactively granted a low-income
housing tax credit. Thus, the Budget Act cannot be justified by the
retroactive tax relief it affords.
The other White House justifications of the Budget Act's retroactivity are equally unconvincing. The Clinton administration has
defended the retroactive tax provisions on the basis that the provior only two percent of the $500 billion deficit reduction package. The Phony
Retroactive Scare, supra note 242, at A16.
282. For obvious reasons, taxpayer evasion should rarely be a concern where
changes in the estate tax are being proposed. Evasion by death would seem to
be a highly unlikely tactic and one which would not even succeed under the

1993 Budget Act. The only possible evasion of an estate tax would be that of
executors of estates where the settlor has already died and the executor is in
charge of the estate while a tax change is in the works.
283. Glazier, supra note 252, at A12.
284. White House, supra note 236, at 15.
285. Cf United States v. Hemme, 476 U.S. 558 (1986) (holding that the elimination of an exemption coupled with a new tax credit that results in a net
benefit to the taxpayer does not violate due process when retroactively applied).
286. Id.
287. Cf Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717
(1984).
288. For further discussion of the retroactive benefits provided by the

Budget Act, see supra note 243.
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sions affect only the top 1.2 percent of individual taxpayers. 28 9 Yet
-the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit
only those takings from the bottom 98.8 percent of the population. 2 90 Thus, the wealth and number of taxpayers burdened by a
retroactive tax should not affect due process analysis.
Likewise, the time required to pay a retroactive tax is irrelevant to due process analysis. The Clinton administration has defended the retroactivity on the basis that taxpayers are allowed the
29 1
to pay the additional taxes over three years without interest.
Yet a taking without due process is not rendered constitutional simply because it is accomplished in annual installments. The payback
schedule of a retroactive tax will not justify a due process violation.
In summary, the government can point to no legitimate legislative
purpose of the retroactive provisions which could justify the due
process violations of the Budget Act.
CONCLUSION.

The retroactive tax provisions of the Budget Act are clearly unconstitutional. Certain aspects of the Budget Act and the circumstances surrounding its enactment distinguish it from prior
retroactive tax cases and make it an ideal candidate for a successful
constitutional attack. Not only was taxpayer reliance on the old
law probable, but many of those who did detrimentally rely on the
prior tax code are now deceased. Such graveyard robbery should be
condemned. Congress has never retroactively increased an estate
tax since the inception of the estate tax in 1916.292 Another historical first about this Act is that for the first time in history one administration is attempting to reach back into the pocketbooks of
taxpayers of the previous administration, and the offensiveness of
such action is exacerbated by the fact that the prior administration
vetoed a similar tax. Allowing this legislating of history would set a
grave precedent for future administrations and Congresses. The
Act also presents the bare minimum Congressional justification of a
retroactive tax: virtually all retroactive taxes have as one of their
purposes the raising of revenue. Here, this is the only justification
for the retroactivity. Moreover, retroactivity permits President
Clinton and Congress to hide from the true effects of their taxes: an
annual tax rate of 39.6% applied retroactively to January 1 is
equivalent to a 51.6% rate applied prospectively from August 1. Finally, the Budget Act presents an excellent opportunity for the judi289.
290.
291.
292.

White House, supra note 236, at 15.
For a discussion of the Fifth Amendment, see supra notes 48-49.
White House, supra note 236, at 15.
Shirley D. Peterson, Death and (Retroactive!) Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, July

24, 1993, at A19.
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ciary to overturn an act of Congress without fearing the practical
consequences of its decision. The retroactive provisions of the Act
account for only two percent of the $496 billion deficit reduction
package. 29 3 It should not take a constitutional amendment to protect taxpayers from retroactive taxes when the Constitution currently provides ample protection.
Carlton v. United States will give the Supreme Court a chance
to restore some life into the concept of taxpayer due process. Since
the early gift tax cases, the taxpayer has had very little success in
convincing the courts that retroactive taxes are repugnant to the
Constitution. The government has continued to encroach upon the
right of the taxpayer to confidently plan his finances in reliance on
the tax laws then in existence. If the Supreme Court finds against
the taxpayer in Carlton, notice will be a moot concept, bringing
down taxpayer due process with it. Due process will be yet another
apparent constitutional bar to retroactive taxes that the Supreme
Court has abandoned out of deference to the ever-increasing power
of Congress to tax. While death and taxes may still be the only
certainties in life, don't expect one to be the end of the other if the
current administration has its way in court.
Andrew G. Schultz

293. Kircheimer, supra note 1, at 912.

